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ABSTRACT
Interchange Fee Rate, Merchant Discount Rate, and Retail Prices in a Credit
Card Network: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
by
GUO Hangfei
Master of Philosophy
We consider two game-theoretic settings to determine the optimal values of an
issuers interchange fee rate, an acquirers merchant discount rate, and a mer-
chants retail prices for multiple products in a credit card network. In the rst
setting, we investigate a two-stage game problem in which the issuer and the
acquirer rst negotiate the interchange fee rate, and the acquirer and the retailer
then determine their merchant discount rate and retail prices, respectively. In
the second setting, motivated by the recent U.S. bill H.R. 2695,we develop a
three-player cooperative game in which the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant
form a grand coalition and bargain over the interchange fee rate and the merchant
discount rate. Following the cooperative game, the retailer makes its retail pric-
ing decisions. We derive both the Shapley value- and the nucleolus-characterized
unique rates for the grand coalition. Comparing the two game settings, we show
that the participation of the merchant in the negotiation process can result in
the reduction of both rates. Moreover, the stability of the grand coalition in
the cooperative game setting may require that the merchant should delegate the
credit card business only to the issuer and the acquirer with su¢ ciently low oper-
ation costs. We also nd that the large, highly-specialized merchants and banks
are more likely to join the cooperative negotiation whereas the small rms may
prefer the two-stage game setting. Our numerical experiments demonstrate that
the acquirers and the issuers unit operation costs more signicantly impact both
rates in the cooperative game setting than in the two-stage game setting.
Key words: interchange fee rate; merchant discount rate; Nash bargaining;
Stackelberg game; supermodularity; Shapley value; nucleolus.
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1 Introduction
In todays retailing markets, many consumers consider the credit card payment
as an important, dominating means to shop from merchants. As the Nilson
Report indicates, 795.5 million MasterCard and Visa cards were held by the
U.S. consumers in 2004 [9]. The consumers who intend to buy now and pay
later are more likely to complete transactions with credit cards. Accordingly, an
increasing number of merchants have been accepting consumerspayments with
credit cards, in order to entice consumers and thus improve their competitiveness
in the markets that they serve. In the United States, the aggregate credit card
transaction amount was 1.7 trillion in 2003, and this number has been quickly
growing [9].
Although shopping with credit cards may generate the risks of excessive spend-
ing and getting into debt, there are still four major benets for both consumers
and businesses, as discussed by Hartman [14]. The rst (largest) advantage of
credit-card payment systems, which applies to both consumers and businesses, is
that credit cards give consumers an increased buying power. We learn from Hart-
man [14] that consumers shopping with credit cards may spend up to 2.5 times
more than consumers buying with cash; and thus, the merchants who accept
credit card payments may achieve a 40% sales increase. The second advantage is
that consumers can more conveniently complete their purchase payments. That
is, it is easier for consumers to pay a single monthly credit card bill than to
write checks or to often visit banks or ATM for cash withdrawal. Moreover, for a
merchant, accepting credit cards reduces the need for employees to make change
and possible daily-accounting mistakes. The third advantage of the credit-card
payment is to provide consumers with an added measure of security, because
consumers can easily cancel lost or stolen credit cards with, e.g., a simple phone
call and stores with less cash on hand are also less susceptible to losing money.
The fourth advantage is that consumers using credit cards can build up a positive
credit rating over time if they use credit responsibly and make timely payments,
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thereby making it easier to nance a home or car in the future. For more infor-
mation regarding the advantages of credit cards, see Hartman [14].
A typical credit card operation in reality usually involves two steps, as shown
in Figure 1. In the rst step, consumers buy products from the merchant and
complete their transactions by conrming their credit card payments. In the
second step, consumers pay the total credit-card transaction amount i.e., con-
sumerstotal expense that is calculated as the sum of the merchants sales revenue
(retail price times sales quantity) for all products from their bank accounts to
the issuer. Next, the issuer retains an interchange fee that is computed as the
transaction amount times an interchange fee rate f as its revenue and transfers
the remaining amount to the acquirer. The acquirer then charges the merchant a
discount fee that equals the transaction amount times a merchant discount rate
d. Note that the merchant discount fee includes the issuers interchange fee. That
is, for an one-dollar credit card transaction, the acquirer obtains the merchant
discount d but pays the interchange fee f to the issuer. It thus follows that
the acquirers revenue generated from this credit card business is (d  f) total
transaction amount. To assure the acquirers non-negative prot, we realistically
assume that d  f . As a result, the merchants sales revenue is (1   d) total
transaction amount. For specic examples illustrating the credit card operation,
see, e.g., Hunt [16].
Figure 1: The two-step credit card transactions. Note that d and f denote the
merchant discount rate and the interchange fee rate, respectively.
In this thesis, we consider a three-echelon credit card network that involves
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an issuer (consumersbank), an acquirer (the merchants bank), and a merchant
that serves consumers with multiple (n  1) products. The consumers use the
credit cards (that are issued by the issuer) to buy from the merchant and pay their
credit-card bills prior to the due dates. We assume that the merchant accepts
the credit card payments. This assumption is reasonable because, in order to
achieve satisfactory sales, most merchants are willing to accept credit cards in
todays retailing industry [33]. In the credit card network, the interchange fee is
used to compensate the issuer for bearing the risk of issuing credit cards, and the
merchant discount fee is used to motivate the acquirer to maintain the merchants
account and process credit card transactions. The interchange and merchant
discount fees have been among the largest costs of merchants who accept the
credit card payments (Akers et al. [1]). If the interchange fee rate is increased,
then the issuer benets more from the credit card operation, and the acquirer
may accordingly raise its merchant discount rate so as to assure its protability.
As a result, the merchants sales revenue may be reduced, and the merchant
may respond by increasing its retail prices to improve its prot. However, a
higher retail price may discourage consumers from buying the product, thereby
resulting in a reduction in the total transaction amount and thus a decrease
in the issuers, the acquirers, and the merchants prots. Following the above
facts, it is important to properly determine the interchange fee rate, the merchant
discount rate, and the retail prices. However, such a decision problem has not
been considered in existing publications, as indicated by our literature review.
In practice, the interchange fee rate is either negotiated by the issuer and
the acquirer or determined jointly by the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant.
Accordingly, we consider two game-theoretic settings to derive the optimal inter-
change fee rate, merchant discount rate, and product retail prices. For the rst
setting, we investigate a two-stage game problem in which the merchant does
not participate in the negotiation of the interchange fee rate. This scenario is
consistent with the fact that the interchange fee rate is normally centrally de-
termined by the credit card companies such as Visa and MasterCard, through a
3
committee comprising at least partially representatives of issuers and acquirers
(Small and Wright [34]). That is, in the rst stage, the issuer and the acquirer
bargain over the interchange fee rate, as discussed by Balto [2] and Small and
Wright [34]. Next, using the negotiated interchange fee rate, the acquirer deter-
mines a merchant discount rate and announces the rate to the merchant, who
then makes retail pricing decisions. The second stage thus involves a sequential
(Stackelberg) game in which the acquirer and the merchant act as the leader and
the follower, respectively. We use backward induction to solve such a game. More
specically, we begin by solving the Stackelberg game between the acquirer and
the merchant, assuming that the interchange fee rate is given. We then use the
interchange fee rate-dependent Stackelberg solution to develop the issuers and
the acquirers prot functions, and use the solution concept of Nash bargaining
scheme [25] to characterize the negotiated interchange fee rate. We show that, if
the price-sensitivity of each product is not high, then the acquirer and the issuer
may be willing to participate in the credit card business.
For the second setting, we consider a three-player cooperative game in which
the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant bargain over the interchange fee rate
and the merchant discount rate. This game is motivated by a recent U.S. legisla-
tion. In June 2009, John Conyers and Bill Shuster who are the House Judiciary
Committee Chairman Representatives introduced the Credit Card Fair Fee
Act of 2009 (H.R. 2695)[15] to the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America, which then enacted the bill to enable merchants to
engage in collectively bargaining on a large scale with banks belonging to credit
card networks such as Visa, MasterCard, etc. As John Conyers and Bill Shuster
explained, this legislation would allow merchants to collectively negotiate with
banks (i.e., acquirers and issuers) for certain credit card fees (i.e., interchange
fee rate and merchant discount rate), and ultimately reduce the costs (i.e., retail
prices) of everyday goods for consumers [46]. We note that, before 2009, many
credit card companies (networks) did not allow merchants to directly bargain over
the interchange fee rate with issuers and acquirers. But certain large merchants
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such as Wal-Mart could still bargain for a lower interchange fee rate (Akers et al.
[1]).
We thus develop a two-step approach to nd the rates for the cooperative game
setting. Following the approach, we rst construct a three-player cooperative
game in characteristic-function form (von Neumann and Morgenstern [41, Ch.
VI]). Then, we investigate whether there exist an interchange fee rate and a
merchant discount rate so that the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant are
willing to cooperate for the credit card business. For similar approaches, see,
e.g., Petrosjan and Zaccour [26], Sexton [30], etc. We show that, our three-player
cooperative game is supermodular only when both the issuer and the acquirer
can signicantly contribute i.e., generate su¢ cient prot surplus to the credit
card network. We also nd that the grand coalition is more likely to be stable
if the operation of each player is more e¢ cient in the acquirer- and the issuer-
related business. We then apply the solution concepts of Shapley value and the
nucleolus to determine the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate
that result in a fair allocation of the system-wide prot among the three players.
We nd that, for most cases, the Shapley value-characterized rates cannot assure
the non-empty core; but, we can always nd the nucleolus-characterized rates
that guarantee the non-emptiness of the core and thus assure the stability of the
grand coalition. Our cooperative game analysis for such a nance problem is
an important focus in this thesis; for other applications of the cooperative game
theory in the nance-operation interface area, see, e.g., Gow and Thomas [13]
where the concepts of Shapley value and the nucleolus were used to determine
interchange fees for bank ATM networks.
Comparing our analytic results in the two game settings, we nd that the
participation of the merchant in the negotiation process indeed helps reduce both
rates, as expected by the U.S. bill H.R. 2695.We show that a large merchant
may have an incentive to undertake the credit card operation by itself, whereas
a small merchant may need to delegate the related credit card business to the
issuer and the acquirer whose unit operation costs are su¢ ciently low. Moreover,
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the participation of the large, highly-specialized banks and merchants is needed
to assure the success of the bill H.R. 2695,whereas the small merchant may be
unlikely to join the credit card network and negotiate the rates with the issuer
and the acquirer. This result may be justied by the fact that, in practice, many
small merchants could be unwilling or against to accept the credit cards when
the interchange fee rate and/or merchant discount rates are high (Tozzi [38] and
Trichur [39]).
We then perform a sensitivity analysis to further investigate the impacts of
the operation costs of the acquirer and the issuer on the optimal interchange fee
rate and merchant discount rate that are obtained in our two game settings. We
nd that the operation costs have more signicant impacts on both rates in the
cooperative game setting than in the two-stage game setting. Moreover, in both
the two-stage and the cooperative game settings, the merchant discount rate is
increasing in the unit operation costs of both the issuer and the acquirer, cA and
cI , and the interchange fee rate is increasing in cI . However, the interchange
fee rate is decreasing in cA in the two-stage game setting, whereas the rate is
decreasing in cA if cA is smaller than a cut-o¤ level and is otherwise increasing in
cA in the cooperative game setting. Our major concluding remarks are provided
in the Conclusion. The proofs of all lemmas, theorems, and corollaries in this
thesis are relegated to Appendices.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review
major publications that are closely related to this thesis, which shows the origi-
nality of our problem. In Sections 3 and 4, we consider a two-stage game problem
and a three-player cooperative game problem, respectively; and for each problem,
we determine a unique interchange fee rate, a unique merchant discount rate, and
a unique retail price for each product sold by the merchant. In Section 5, we per-
form a sensitivity analysis to examine the impacts of four important parameters
on both the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate determined by
using the two-stage game model and those determined by using the three-player
cooperative game model. The thesis ends with our summary and concluding
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remarks in Section 6.
2 Literature Review
This thesis is associated with those concerning retail pricing-, interchange fee rate-
, and merchant discount rate-related problems in credit card networks. Most ex-
isting relevant papers have been reviewed by Chakravorti [7], Hunt [16], Bolt and
Chakravorti [5], and Verdier [40]. Note that the rst two articles (i.e., Chakra-
vorti [7] and Hunt [16]) mainly focused on the costs and benets of credit cards,
the third article (i.e., Bolt and Chakravorti [5]) categorized major economic mod-
els for credit card operations, and the fourth article (i.e., Verdier [40]) surveyed
the recent literature about the interchange fee rate in payment card systems.
Since the thesis is concerned with quantitative (game-theoretic) analysis for a
credit card network, we next briey describe Chakravorti [7], Hunt [16], and
Verdier [40], and then particularly discussed several relevant publications that
were reviewed by Bolt and Chakravorti [5]. But, our review di¤ers from Bolt
and Chakravorti [5] since we focus on describing the problems rather than the
economic models in the publications that are signicantly related to the thesis;
this distinguishes the thesis from extant publications.
In Chakravorti [7], Chakravorti discussed the costs and benets of credit cards
to network participants (i.e., consumers, merchants, acquirers, issuers, etc.), and
then summarized major publications that had concerned key features in credit
card networks, including merchant pricing policy, interchange fees, merchant ac-
ceptance, and network competition. Though, we nd that each publication re-
viewed by Chakravorti [7] didnt capture all of the above key features but only
analyzed one or some of these features. Di¤erent from Chakravorti [7], Hunt
[16] didnt conduct a review from the perspective of the operations of credit card
networks but only provided a brief overview of the economics of the payment
card industry. In Verdier [40], Verdier reviewed the theoretical results of recent
literature, with an emphasis on the ongoing debate that opposes banks to the
7
regulatory institutions or the competition authorities in various countries.
As the latest publication for the review of credit card-related literature, Bolt
and Chakravorti [5] classied relevant economic models into the following ve
categories that consider di¤erent issues: (i) models focusing on interchange fees;
(ii) models with price di¤erentiation at the point of sale; (iii) models with com-
petition between networks; (iv) models accounting for the role of credit; and (v)
models with competition among payment instruments. Since the thesis focuses
on how to determine the interchange fee rate, merchant discount rate, and retail
prices for the merchant, we discuss some relevant papers in categories (i) and
(ii). As Bolt and Chakravorti [5] reviewed, the seminal interchange fee-related
publication was proposed by Baxter [3], who constructed a one-period model to
investigate an interchange fee problem, assuming that the market is perfectly
competitive for payment service and consumption goods. The author concluded
that the interchange fee is an important and necessary tool that balances con-
sumersand the merchants demand and the issuersand the acquirerscosts.
Schmalensee [28] extended Baxters model by assuming that issuers and ac-
quirers have signicant market powers while merchants are perfectly competitive.
Similar to Baxter [3], Schmalensee [28] found that, as a balancing device, the in-
terchange fee can increase the value of a credit card system by properly allocating
costs between issuers and acquirers and thus reasonably determining the cost al-
location between consumers and merchants. We note that both Baxter [3] and
Schmalensee [28] ignored the strategic interactions of consumers and merchants,
which is actually not negligible because of the following fact: if more consumers
use credit cards, then more merchants accept credit cards, which further increases
the number of consumers who use credit cards for their purchases.
As an early publication involving the strategic interactions of consumers and
merchants, Rochet and Tirole [27] constructed a quantitative model where issuers
have market powers but acquirers are perfectly competitive, and consumers and
merchants decide rationally on whether to buy or accept a payment card. More
specically, Rochet and Tirole considered the following three-stage problem: At
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Stage 1, a central planner sets an interchange fee rate to maximize total prot
that is calculated as the sum of the merchants, the acquirersand the issuers
prots or the issuers set an interchange fee rate to maximize their own prots.
At Stage 2, the issuers set credit card-related fees for their customers, who can
decide whether or not to have a card. The merchants decide whether to accept
payment cards, and then determine their retail prices. At Stage 3, the customers
observe the retail prices and whether cards are accepted, and then pick a mer-
chant for their purchases. If a customer chooses a merchant that doesnt accept
credit cards, then both the customer and the merchant incur opportunity costs
of using an alternative payment method. Using the backward approach, Rochet
and Tirole [27] obtained the equilibrium retail prices for the merchants, and then
calculated the socially-optimal interchange fee for the central planner and the
privately-optimal fee for the issuers. The authors found that the socially-optimal
interchange fee rate for the central planner is higher than the socially-optimal
interchange fee rate that was attained by Baxter [3], which happens due to the
issuersmarket powers.
Using the framework in Schmalensee [28] where the merchants may not accept
credit cards for some strategic reasons, Wright [44] developed a model where the
partial participation of heterogeneous consumers and merchants is allowed in a
two-sided market (that is, the credit card market composed of cardholders and
merchants). Wright found that the privately-optimal interchange fee rate may
be very high, if the merchant discount fees are increasing in the interchange fees
and the issuers dont charge the acquirers any additional interchange fees that
are treated as rewards to customers. Our review indicates that the above pub-
lications (i.e., Baxter [3], Rochet and Tirole [27], Schmalensee [28], and Wright
[44]) considered the centralized case in which the interchange fee rate is deter-
mined by a central planner or a credit card company/association such as Visa
and MasterCard.
Di¤erent from the above publications, Balto [2] questioned the rationality of
centrally-determined interchange fee rate, and argued that a lower interchange
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fee rate could be determined as a result of the bilateral negotiation between the
acquirers and the issuers. During the mid-1980s, there were 10,000 to 15,000
members in the Visa network. Many practitioners believed that the negotiation
cost among these members might be too high to determine the interchange fee
rate according to the bilateral negotiation. However, as Balto [2] discussed, the
past two decades witnesses a signicant reduction of the cost of bilateral negoti-
ation between the issuers and the acquirers, because a few large-size issuers and
acquirers have dominated the issuing and acquiring markets. Even though the
negotiated interchange fee problem is important, we nd that very few papers
have addressed the problem; thus, this is still under-researched. Assuming that
the interchange fee rate is negotiated rather than centrally determined, Small
and Wright [34] constructed an Nash bargaining model to characterize the bilat-
eral bargaining over the interchange fee rate. The authors discussed the hold-up
problem that results from the honour all cards rule (i.e., the merchants and
their banks (acquirers) in a credit card network must accept all the cards is-
sued in the network), and they found that, as a result of implementing the rule,
the bilaterally-negotiated interchange fee rate may be higher than the centrally-
determined interchange fee rate. Small and Wright [34] used the concept Nash
bargaining schemeto analyze the bilateral bargaining problem; but, they didnt
consider the merchants retail pricing decision. The thesis di¤ers from Small and
Wright [34] since we also determine the retail prices for the merchant in a credit
card network. Even though some publications (e.g., Rochet and Tirole [27]) con-
sidered the retail pricing decision, they didnt investigate the bargaining process
for the interchange fee rate decision, which is also involved in the thesis.
As discussed in Section 1, the interchange fee rate indirectly a¤ects each mer-
chants pricing decision because the retail price depends on the merchant discount
rate that is determined by the acquirer according to the interchange fee rate.
Thus, the merchants should have an incentive to participate in the negotiation
of the interchange fee rate. Before 2009, many credit card companies (networks)
didnt allow the merchants to directly bargain over the interchange fee rate with
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the issuers. But, we note that some large merchants (e.g., Wal-Mart) could still
negotiate with the credit card companies for a lower interchange fee rate; see,
e.g. Akers et al. [1]. In June 2009, the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America enacted the bill entitled Credit Card Fair Fee Act
of 2009 (H.R. 2695) [15], which allows merchants to engage in bargaining over
relevant fee rates (i.e., the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate)
with banks belonging to credit card networks (e.g., Visa, MasterCard, etc.) in
the United States. This bill would be helpful to decreasing the banking fees and
ultimately reducing the retail prices of everyday goods for consumers.
According to our review, we nd that Thomas [36] used the multi-player co-
operative game theory to analyze the credit card-related problems. Motived by
the major changes in the distribution of the credit card costs e.g., the introduc-
tion of annual fees, the lowering of merchant service charges, etc. in the U.K.
at the end of 1980s, the author analyzed the fair allocation of the credit card-
related costs among the credit card companies, the retailers who accept the credit
card payments, and the cardholders. More specically, Thomas [36] developed a
credit-card cooperative game in the linear characteristic-value function, applied
the concepts of the core, Shapley value, and the nucleolus to numerical examples,
and performed a sensitivity analysis to examine the impacts of debit cards on
credit-card fee structures. But, Thomas [36] did not analytically consider the
interchange fee rate, merchant discount rate, and the retail prices.
Di¤erent from the aforementioned papers, we examine a two-stage game to
investigate the negotiated interchange fee rate and to derive the optimal merchant
discount rate and the optimal retail pricing decisions. In addition, motivated by
the recent U.S. legislation H.R. 2695 [15], we consider a three-player game where
the acquirer, the issuer, and the merchant negotiate the interchange fee rate and
the merchant discount rate. This signicantly distinguishes the thesis from the
existing literature.
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3 The Two-Stage Game Analysis
In this section, we analyze a two-stage game to determine the interchange fee rate
f , merchant discount rate d, and retail prices pi (i = 1; : : : ; n) for n  1 products
in a credit card network. In the rst stage, the issuer (i.e., consumersbank) and
the acquirer (i.e., the merchants bank) bargain over the interchange fee rate. In
the second stage, the acquirer determines and announces a merchant discount
rate to the merchant, who then makes its retail pricing decisions for n di¤erent
products. More specically, we investigate a two-person cooperative game to nd
the interchange fee rate as a result of the negotiation between the issuer and the
acquirer in the rst stage. This cooperative-game approach reects the following
fact: In practice, when the issuer transfers to the acquirer a transaction amount
that a consumer spends with his or her credit card to buy from the merchant, the
issuer deducts an interchange fee (as the rate f times the transaction amount)
from the amount to the acquirer. The interchange fee rate is normally centrally
determined by the credit companies such as Visa and MasterCard. We learn from,
e.g., Small andWright [34] that Visa and MasterCard determine their interchange
fee rates through a committee comprised at least partially of representatives of
issuers and acquirers.
Accordingly, we develop a two-person cooperative game to characterize the
negotiation between the acquirer and the issuer for the interchange fee rate in the
rst stage. The negotiation process is then followed by a non-cooperative game
in the second stage, where the acquirer determines a merchant discount rate and
announces the rate to the merchant, who then makes its retail pricing decisions for
n di¤erent products. That is, in the non-cooperative game, the acquirer and the
merchant act as the leader and the follower, respectively, which is thus regarded
as a leader-follower (Stackelberg) game.
As indicated by the above, the cooperative game involving the issuer and the
acquirer occurs before the non-cooperative (leader-follower) game takes place be-
tween the acquirer and the merchant. To solve our two-stage problem, we should
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rst examine the non-cooperative game, assuming that the interchange fee rate
is given; and then, we analyze the two-person cooperative game to determine the
negotiated interchange fee rate. Specically, we conduct the following sequential
analysis:
1. Analysis of the Leader-Follower Game for a Given Interchange
Fee Rate. We assume that the interchange fee rate f is given, and solve
the leader-follower game to nd the Stackelberg solution for the given value
of f . To do so, we rst nd the merchants best-response pricing decisions
for n products, and then calculate the acquirers optimal merchant discount
rate. Substituting the optimal merchant discount rate into the merchants
best response function, we obtain the Stackelberg solution in terms of the
given interchange fee rate f .
2. Analysis of the Two-Person Cooperative Game. Using the f dependent
Stackelberg solution that is obtained in the rst step, we construct a two-
person cooperative game and solve it to nd Nash bargaining scheme that
characterizes the interchange fee rate f  resulting from the negotiation be-
tween the acquirer and the issuer. Substituting f  into the f dependent
Stackelberg solution gives the equilibrium merchant discount rate d and
retail prices pi (i = 1; : : : ; n).
3.1 The Analysis of the Stackelberg Game in the Second
Stage
Assuming that the interchange fee rate f is given, we solve the leader-follower
game to determine the f dependent Stackelberg solution (d(f);p(f)) where
p(f)  (p1(f); : : : ; pn(f)). Next, we rst calculate the merchants best-response
prices pi (d; f) (i = 1; : : : ; n), and then nd the Stackelberg solution (d
(f);p(f)).
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3.1.1 The Merchants Best-Response Pricing Decision
We now determine the merchants best-response pricing decisions that maximize
the merchants prot when the acquirers merchant discount rate d is given. The
merchant is assumed to serve customers in a market with n  1 products. The
merchant obtains product i (i = 1; : : : ; n) at the acquisition cost ci, and sells
it at the retail price pi. Since the sale price of a product usually a¤ects the
demand for the product, we assume that the demand for product i (i = 1; : : : ; n)
is dependent on the retail price pi. The price-dependent demand for product i is
denoted by qi(pi). This assumption has been widely used in economics, nance,
and operations management; see Bertrand [4], Corbett and Karmarkar [8], Lim
and Ho [21], and the references therein. In this thesis, we also assume that qi(pi)
is a deterministic, linear price-dependent demand function, which is given as,
qi(pi) = i   ipi, for i = 1; : : : ; n, (1)
where i > 0 denotes the price-independent demand; and i > 0 represents the
marginal impact of the price.
To assure that the demand qi(pi) is non-negative, we assume that the param-
eter i is su¢ ciently large such that i  ici, for i = 1; : : : ; n. Moreover, to
generate the non-negative sales of product i, the merchant should determine the
retail price such that pi  i=i. Thus, for product i, (pi   ci)=pi = 1  ci=pi 
(i   ici)=i. Note that the ratio (pi   ci)=pi is regarded as the well-known
Lerner index[20]. Lerner index reects a rms market power; that is, a rm
with a higher value of Lerner index has a greater power in the market that it
serves. Therefore, to assure that qi(pi)  0, the merchants market power for
product i should be smaller than or equal to (i ici)=i, i = 1; : : : ; n, which is
the relative measure of the maximum demand for product i (i.e., i   ici) over
the constant, price-independent demand i.
Next, the merchants sale revenue and total acquisition cost can be computed
as R Pni=1 pi  qi(pi) and c Pni=1 ci  qi(pi), respectively. Since the acquirer
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charges the merchant $d per dollar of the sale revenue R, the merchant needs
to pay the merchant discount fee in the amount of T = d  R to the acquirer.
The merchants prot is calculated as its sale revenue minus the sum of total
acquisition cost and merchant discount fees; i.e.,
M = R  c  T =
Xn
i=1
[(1  d)pi   ci] qi(pi), (2)
where [(1   d)pi   ci] can be regarded as the merchants net prot per unit.
That is, when the merchant sells one unit of product i, it can achieve the prot
$[(1   d)pi   ci], which should be greater than or equal to zero. This requires
that the merchant should determine the price pi such that pi  ci=(1 d). Recall
from our previous discussion that the price should be smaller than or equal to
i=i. Hence, the acquirers merchant discount rate d should be determined such
that ci=(1  d)  i=i, or, d  (i   ici)=i for i = 1; : : : ; n. This requires the
assumption that i  ici, for i = 1; : : : ; n.
When the merchant makes his pricing decisions for n products, we assume
that the acquirers merchant discount rate decision d is smaller than or equal to
  min[(i   ici)=i; i = 1; : : : ; n], i.e., d  . Otherwise, if d > , then the
merchant cannot achieve the nonnegative sale prot for some or all products, and
is thus unwilling to join the credit card network. Moreover, for an one-dollar
credit card transaction, the acquirer obtains the merchant discount rate $d but
pays the interchange fee $f to the issuer. To assure the acquirers non-negative
prot, d should be greater than or equal to f . Therefore, the acquirer should
determine its merchant discount rate such that f  d  .
To nd optimal pricing decisions for n products, the merchant should maxi-
mize its prot M in (2) subject to ci=(1  d)  pi  i=i for i = 1; : : : ; n. The
merchants constrained maximization problem is thus developed as,
max
pi;i=1;:::;n
M =
Pn
i=1[(1  d)pi   ci] qi(pi)
s.t. ci=(1  d)  pi  i=i, for i = 1; : : : ; n.
(3)
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Theorem 1 Given the acquirers merchant discount rate d in the range [f; ],
the merchants best-response retail price for product i (i = 1; : : : ; n) is uniquely
found as,
pi(d) =
1
2

i
i
+
ci
1  d

. J (4)
Proof. For a proof of this theorem and the proofs for all subsequent theorems,
see Appendix A.
We notice from (4) that the merchants best-response price for product i i.e.,
pi(d) is increasing in d. This means that, as d increases, the merchant should
respond by raising its price. When the acquirer doesnt charge the merchant any
merchant discount rate, i.e., d = 0, the merchant can reduce its price to the
minimum (i=i + ci)=2.
Using the above, we can calculate the merchants optimal quantities qi(d) and
optimal credit card sale revenue R(d), which is regarded as the total transaction
amount in the credit card network. That is,
qi(d) = i   ipi = i  
1
2
i

i
i
+
ci
1  d

=
1
2

i   ici
(1  d)

, (5)
R(d) =
Xn
i=1
pi(d) qi(d) = 1
4

!1   !2
(1  d)2

, (6)
where
!1 
Xn
i=1
2i
i
and !2 
Xn
i=1
ic
2
i . (7)
Remark 1 When d  , we nd that !1  !2=(1   d)2, and the merchants
sales revenue R(d) in (6) is non-negative. This implies that, if d  , then the
merchant should accept the transactions with credit cards. Moreover, we learn
from our above discussion that (i   ici)=i (i = 1; : : : ; n) represents the ratio
of the maximum demand of product i (i.e., i   ici) to the constant, price-
independent demand of product i (i.e., i), and also note that  is the minimum
value of the ratios for all products. That is, if the demand for each product ismore
sensitive to the retail price, i.e., the values of i (i = 1; : : : ; n) are lower, then
the value of  is smaller and the merchant discount rate should be accordingly
16
reduced to assure the non-negative sales. But, the acquirer and the issuer may
be less willing to participate in the credit card business, because the acquirers
merchant discount rate d includes the interchange fee rate gained by the issuer.
Thus, in order to assure the success of the credit card business, the demand of
each product in the market should not be very sensitive to its retail price. J
Substituting pi(d) in (4) and qi(d) in (5) into the merchants prot function
M in (2), we calculate the merchants resulting prot as,
M(d) =
Xn
i=1
[(1  d)pi(d)  ci] qi (pi(d)) = 1
4
Xn
i=1
[(1  d)i   ici]2
(1  d) i
, (8)
which is non-negative. In addition, we notice from (8) that M(d) is decreasing in
d; that is, the merchants prot is reduced when the acquirer increase its merchant
discount rate d. Since 0  d  , we nd that merchants prot is between 0 andPn
i=1(i   ici)2=4i.
3.1.2 The Interchange Fee Rate-Dependent Stackelberg Solution
We learn from the preceding section that the total credit card transaction amount
is R(d) as given in (6). When the acquirer makes a transfer to the merchants
account, the acquirer charges the merchant a merchant discount fee that is
computed as the merchant discount rate d times the transaction amount R(d)
so that the merchant cannot obtain the sale revenue R(d) but only receives the
amount [(1   d)  R(d)] from the acquirer. Since, for the transaction amount
R(d), the acquirer transfers to the issuer the interchange fee f R(d) and retains
the amount of (d  f)R(d).
Assume that the acquirer incurs the unit operation cost cA, which means that,
when the acquirer processes the credit card transaction in amount of R(d), its
operation cost is calculated as cA  R(d). We then develop the acquirers prot
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function as,
A(d)  (d  f   cA)R(d)
=
1
4
(d  f   cA)

!1   !2
(1  d)2

, (9)
where (d  f   cA) represents the acquirers net prot per dollar; and the second
equation is obtained by using (6). Particularly, when the acquirer processes one
dollar of credit-card transaction amount, it can achieve the prot $[(d  f   cA)],
which should be greater than or equal to zero. This requires that the acquirer
should determine the merchant discount rate d such that d  f + cA. Note that,
as discussed in Section 3.1.1, the merchant discount rate d should be greater than
or equal to f but smaller than or equal to . Hence, the acquirers merchant
discount rate d must be determined such that f + cA  d  . Given the value
of interchange fee rate f , the acquirer should maximize its prot A subject to
f + cA  d  , in order to nd the optimal merchant discount rate d(f).
Theorem 2 Given the interchange fee rate f , the acquirers optimal merchant
discount rate d(f) is uniquely computed as,
d(f) =
8><>: d1(f), if f  f^ ,, if f^  f  , (10)
where d1(f) denotes a unique solution of the following equation,
!1  [1  d1(f)]3 = !2  [1 + d1(f)  2f   2cA]; (11)
and
f^  (1 +   2cA)!2   (1  )
3!1
2!2
. J (12)
Note that d(f) given in (10) is the f dependent Stackelberg merchant dis-
count rate. In addition, Theorem 2 indicates that, if the interchange fee rate f
rises, then the acquirer should respond by increasing its merchant discount rate.
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But, this may discourage the merchant to accept customerspurchases with credit
cards. In order to assure that the merchant is willing to trade with credit cards,
the acquirer should bear a portion of the increase in the interchange fee rate. It
thus follows that the increase in the merchant discount rate is smaller than the
increase in f .
Corollary 1 The f dependent Stackelberg merchant discount rate d(f) is in-
creasing in the interchange fee rate f , i.e., @[d(f)]=@f  0; but, @[d(f)]=@f < 1.
Moreover, we nd that d(f) is a convex function of f , i.e., @2[d(f)]=@f 2  0.
J
Proof. For a proof of this corollary and the proofs for all subsequent corollaries,
see Appendix B.
Using d(f) in (10) to replace d in the merchants best-response retail prices
pi(d) (i = 1; : : : ; n) given in (4), we can nd the set of n f dependent Stackelberg
retail prices as p(f) = (p1(f); : : : ; p

n(f)), where, for i = 1; : : : ; n,
pi (f) =
8>><>>:
1
2

i
i
+
ci
(1  d1(f))

, if f  f^ ,
1
2

i
i
+
ci
(1  )

, if f^  f  .
(13)
In addition, when the acquirer and the merchant choose their Stackelberg solu-
tions, the corresponding credit-card transaction amount in (6) is computed as,
R(d(f)) =
8>><>>:
1
4

!1   !2
[1  d1(f)]2

 0, if f  f^ ,
1
4

!1   !2
(1  )2

 0, if f^  f  ,
(14)
where both !1   !2=[1  d1(f)]2 and !1   !2=(1  )2 are nonnegative, because
d1(f)   if f  f^ ; and as Remark 1 indicates, !1 !2=(1 d)2  0 when d  .
As a result, we substitute d(f) in (10) into (9), and nd that, for a given
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value of f , the acquirers maximum prot is computed as,
A(d
(f))
=
8>><>>:
A1 
1
4
[d1(f)  f   cA]

!1   !2
(1  d1(f))2

 0, if f  f^ ,
A2 
1
4
(  f   cA)

!1   !2
(1  )2

 0, if f^  f  .
(15)
Note that, when f = f^ , d1(f) =  and A1 = A2 .
3.2 The Analysis of the Two-Person Cooperative Game
in the First Stage
We now investigate the rst-stage game problem in which the acquirer and the
issuer bargain over the interchange fee rate f , assuming that the two players have
complete information regarding the leader-follower game that is discussed in Sec-
tion 3.1. Under the assumption, the acquirer and the issuer can forecast the
Stackelberg solution for any given value of f . After we calculate the negotiated
interchange fee rate f , we can substitute f  into the f dependent Stackelberg
solution (d(f);p(f)) which is obtained in Section 3.1 and obtain the Stack-
elberg equilibrium (d;p) = (d(f );p(f )) for the leader-follower game taking
place at the second stage in our two-stage problem.
To analyze the two-player bargaining problem between the acquirer and the
issuer, we can use cooperative game solution concepts such as egalitarian proposal,
negotiation set, Nash bargaining scheme (a.k.a. Nash arbitration scheme), etc.
Among these solutions, Nash bargaining scheme (Nash [25]) is the most useful one
because it represents a unique bargaining solution that can be obtained by solving
the following maximization problem: maxy1;y2(y1  y01)(y2  y02), s.t. (y1; y2) 2 P,
where yi and y0i correspond to player is prot and security level (a.k.a. status quo
point), respectively, i = 1, 2; and P denotes the set of Pareto optimal solutions,
i.e., P = f(y1; y2)jy1  y01; y2  y02g. This concept has been broadly used to
analyze a variety of bargaining problems in the nance eld; see, e.g., Cai [6] ,
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Ericsson and Renault [11] , etc. Next, we compute the Nash bargaining scheme
to characterize the negotiated interchange fee rate.
3.2.1 Nash Bargaining Scheme
We nd from Section 3.1 that, given the interchange fee rate f , the acquirer and
the merchant determine their merchant discount rate and retail prices respectively
in the leader-follower game setting, which results in the credit-card transaction
amount R(d(f)) as given in (14). As a result, the acquirers prot is A(d(f))
in (15); and the issuer obtains the interchange fee f  R(d(f)) but absorbs the
operation cost cI  R(d(f)), where cI denotes the issuers unit operation cost
per transaction dollar. It follows that the issuers prot I(f) is calculated as,
I(f) = (f   cI)  R(d(f)), where (f   cI) is the issuers net prot per dollar.
To assure the non-negativity of I(f), the issuer only accepts the negotiated
interchange fee rate that is greater than or equal to cI . Since, as indicated by
(14), the total transaction amount R(d(f)) is dependent on the value of f , the
issuers prot function is written as,
I(f) =
8>><>>:
I1 

f   cI
4



!1   !2
(1  d1(f))2

 0, if cI  f  f^ ,
I2 

f   cI
4



!1   !2
(1  )2

 0, if f^  f  .
(16)
where both I1 and I2 are non-negative, as discussed in Section 3.1.2.
In our bargaining problem, we, w.l.o.g., assume that the acquirer and the
issuer are player 1 and player 2, respectively. From our previous discussion, we
nd that the acquirers and the issuers prots are y1 = A(d(f)) [as given in (15)]
and y2 = I(f) [as given in (16)], respectively. We next compute the two players
security levels (y01; y
0
2), which, for our problem, are dened as these two players
guaranteed prots when they dont cooperate for the credit card business. Since
neither the acquirer nor the issuer will gain any prot if no transaction occurs
between them, the status quo point is (y01; y
0
2) = (0; 0) and the set of Pareto
optimal solutions is P = f(y1; y2)jA(d(f))  0 and I(f)  0g.
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According to the above discussion, the Nash bargaining scheme (NBS) model
for our bargaining problem can be written as: maxf (f)  A(d(f))  I(f),
s.t. A(d(f))  0 and I(f)  0. Using (15) and (16), we specify the NBS
function (f) as,
(f) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
1(f)  [d1(f)  f   cA] (f   cI)
16


!1   !2
(1  d1(f))2
2
, if cI  f  f^ ,
2(f)  (  f   cA) (f   cI)
16


!1   !2
(1  )2
2
, if f^  f  .
(17)
We learn from (15) and (16) that, when cI  f  , A(d(f))  0 and I(f)  0.
That is, in order to nd the NBS solution, we need to consider the following
maximization problem: maxf2[cI ;] (f), where the objective function (f) is
given as in (17).
Note that (f) in (17) may be 1(f) or 2(f), which depends on the value of
f . Thus, in order to nd the optimal interchange fee rate f , we should consider
the following two scenarios: cI  f  f^ and f^  f  ; and maximize (f) for
each scenario. Accordingly, we next (i) maximize 1(f) subject to cI  f  f^ ,
and nd the optimal solution f 1  arg max(1(f); cI  f  f^) and calculate
1(f

1 ); (ii) maximize 2(f) subject to f^  f  , and nd the optimal solution
f 2  arg max(2(f); f^  f  ) and calculate 2(f 2 ); and (iii) compare 1(f 1 )
and 2(f 2 ) to nd the NBS-based interchange fee rate f
.
The NBS Solution under the Constraint that cI  f  f^ We now max-
imize the function 1(f) in (17) under the constraint that cI  f  f^ , and nd
the corresponding NBS-based interchange fee rate f 1 . We begin by analyzing the
property of the function 1(f), which is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The function 1(f) in (17) is strictly log-concave in the interchange
fee rate f ; that is, ln[1(f)] is a strictly concave function of f . J
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Proof. see Appendix C.
The log-concavity of the function 1(f) in (17) implies that 1(f) is a quasi-
concave (unimodal) function of f with a unique maximizing value ~f1  arg max 1(f).
Next, we determine the optimal interchange fee rate f 1 by maximizing 1(f) sub-
ject to cI  f  f^ .
Theorem 3 The optimal interchange fee rate f 1 that maximizes 1(f) in (17)
subject to cI  f  f^ is uniquely found as f 1 = min( ~f1; f^), where ~f1 is a unique
solution that satises the following equation,

[d1(f

1 )  2f 1   cA] + cI + (f 1   cI)
@[d1(f

1 )]
@f

!1   !2
[1  d1(f 1 )]2

= 4 (f 1   cI) [d1(f 1 )  f 1   cA]

!2
(1  d1(f 1 ))3
 @[d1(f

1 )]
@f

, (18)
where @[d1(f 1 )]=@f = 2!2=f3[1  d1(f 1 )]2!1 + !2g. J
The NBS Solution under the Constraint that f^  f   When f^  f 
, then the optimal merchant discount rate is , the corresponding transaction
amount is [!1 !2=(1 )2], and the NBS function is 2(f) as given in (17). We
next maximize 2(f) subject to f^  f  , to nd the optimal interchange fee
rate f 2 .
Theorem 4 The optimal interchange fee rate f 2 is uniquely determined as,
f 2 =
8><>:
~f2  (  cA + cI)=2, if r1  r2,
f^ , if r1  r2,
(19)
where f^ is given as in (12); and,
r1  (1  cA   cI)=(1  )3 and r2  !1=!2. J (20)
The NBS-Based Interchange Fee Rate In order to nd the interchange fee
rate f  maximizing (f) in (17), we need to compare 1(f 1 ) and 2(f

2 ), where
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f 1 and f

2 are given as in Theorems 3 and 4, respectively.
Theorem 5 When the acquirer and the issuer bargain over the interchange fee
rate, we nd that the NBS-characterized rate f  is uniquely determined as follows:
1. If r1  r2 where ri (i = 1; 2) are given as in (20), then we obtain f  as,
f  =
8><>: f

1 , if 1(f

1 )  2( ~f2),
~f2, if 1(f 1 )  2( ~f2),
(21)
where ~f2 is given as in (19).
2. If r1  r2, then the interchange fee rate f  is obtained as f 1 , which falls in
the range [cI ; f^ ]. J
As the above theorem indicates, the negotiated interchange-fee rate may be
greater than or may be smaller than f^ , which depends on the values of r1 and
r2. We learn from (20) that, if the acquirers and/or the issuers per dollar
operation costs (i.e., cA and cI) are su¢ ciently small such that r1  r2, then the
two players would determine an interchange fee rate smaller than or equal to f^ ,
that is, f 1 2 [cI ; f^ ]. Otherwise, the two players may choose a high rate in the
range [f^ ; ]. The result happens simply because of the following reason: If the
issuer incurs a high operation cost, then the player attempts to charge a high
interchange fee rate to o¤set its cost; if the acquirer absorbs a high operation
cost, then the acquirer may increase the merchant discount rate; this raises the
acquirers prot margin (i.e., the merchant discount rate minus the interchange
fee rate) if the interchange fee rate is unchanged. However, by observing this, the
issuer would accordingly bargain with the acquirer to increase its interchange fee
rate.
3.2.2 Stackelberg Equilibrium
After the acquirer and the issuer determine their NBS-characterized interchange
fee rate f  given in Theorem 5, the acquirer and the merchant behave in a leader-
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follower game in which the acquirer determines the merchant discount rate and
announces it to the merchant who then make the retail pricing decision. In
Section 3.1, we obtain the f dependent Stackelberg solution (d(f);p(f)), for
a given value of f . Substituting the NBS-based rate f  (given in Theorem 5)
into (d(f);p(f)), we have the Stackelberg equilibrium (dS;pS) where pS 
(pS1 ; : : : p
S
n) with p
S
i (i = 1; : : : ; n) denoting the Stackelberg retail price for the ith
product as,
(dS;pS) =
8><>: (;p
( ~f2)), if r1  r2 and 1(f 1 )  2( ~f2),
(d(f 1 );p
(f 1 )), otherwise,
(22)
where d(f) and p(f) are given in Section 3.1.2; and f 1 and ~f2 are obtained as
given in Theorems 3 and 4.
Remark 2 We nd from the above that the negotiated interchange fee rate and
the Stackelberg merchant discount are ~f2 and , respectively, if r1  r2 and
1(f

1 )  2( ~f2); and they are f 1 and d(f 1 ), otherwise. Hence, the acquirer and
the issuer should both obtain positive prots. However, we note from (16) that
I2 is strictly increasing in f . That is, if the issuer determines the interchange fee
rate by maximizing its own prot rather than by bargaining with the acquirer,
then the optimal rate should be either a value maximizing I1 in the range [cI ; f^ ]
or . Note that, if f = , then the acquirers merchant discount rate d is also
equal to , because the acquirer should determine its discount rate such that
d  , as discussed in Section 3.1.1. It thus follows that, if the interchange fee
rate is determined by the issuer itself rather than by the negotiation, then the
acquirers prot would possibly be zero. This means that the negotiation may
help increase the acquirers prot and keep it to stay in the credit card network.
C
To illustrate our above analysis, we next provide three examples which corre-
spond to the single-product, two-product, and three-product cases, in which the
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merchant serves the market with one, two and three products, respectively.
Example 1 We rst consider a simple, single-product case, where the merchants
unit acquisition cost of the product is c1 = $100 per unit, and the parameters in
the demand function in (1) are assumed to be 1 = 80 and 1 = 0:7. We also
assume that the issuers and the acquirers operation costs per dollar are $0:006
and $0:005, i.e., cI = 0:006 and cA = 0:005. According to Theorem 5, we nd
that the NBS-characterized interchange fee rate is f  = 3:57%. Then, using (22),
we obtain the Stackelberg merchant discount rate and retail price for the product
as dS = 8:43% and pS = $111:75, respectively.
We then consider a two-product case in which the parameters for product 1
are the same as the above for the single-product case, and the parameters for
product 2 are specied as follows: 2 = 85, 2 = 0:70, and c2 = 99. Similarly,
we nd the NBS interchange fee rate as f  = 4:43%, the Stackelberg merchant
discount rate as dS = 10:51%, and the Stackelberg retail prices for products 1
and 2 as p1 = $113:01 and p2 = $116:03, respectively.
Next, we analyze a three-product case in which the merchant sells three
products that is, products 1, 2, and 3. Assuming that the parameter values
for products 1 and 2 are the same as those in the above two-product case, we set
the parameter value for product 3 as follows: 3 = 78, 3 = 0:65, and c3 = 102.
The issuers and the acquirers operation costs per dollar are the same as those for
the single- and two-product cases. We compute the NBS-based interchange fee
rate as f  = 4:37%, the Stackelberg merchant discount rate as dS = 10:37%, and
the Stackelberg retail prices of the three products as p1 = $112:93, p2 = $115:94,
and p3 = $116:90, respectively. 
4 The Cooperative Game Analysis
We learn from our discussion in Section 1 that, in practice, the merchant may
bargain with the acquirer over the merchant discount rate; see, e.g., MasterCard
26
[23]. Moreover, if the merchant has a su¢ ciently strong power, then it may also
intend to negotiate the interchange fee rate with the issuer, because, as discussed
in Section 3, the interchange fee rate a¤ects the merchant discount rate which
then impacts the merchants retail pricing decision; for details, see Akers et al.
[1]. As discussed in Section 1, the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America, which then enacted the bill Credit Card Fair Fee
Act of 2009 (H.R. 2695)[15] in June 2009. This legislation allows merchants to
collectively bargain with banks (i.e., the acquirers and issuers) over the cost of
certain credit card fees (i.e., the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount
rate), and ultimately reduce the costs (i.e., retail prices) of everyday goods for
consumers. For more discussions on the bill, see, e.g., Zywicki [46] .
Motived by the above fact, we now allow the merchant to negotiate with the
acquirer and the issuer for the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate.
This is di¤erent from Section 3 in which the merchant cannot bargain with other
players but only accept the rates and respond by determining its retail prices.
Thus, in order to determine the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount
rate, we need to develop a three-player cooperative game that characterizes the
bargaining among the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant. In the theory of
Cooperative Games with side payments, which was introduced by von Neumann
and Morgenstern who assumed that (i) players can communicate with each other
and form coalitions with other players, and (ii) players can make side payments
to other players; for more discussion, see, for example, Stra¢ n [35].
The cooperative game theory with n  3 players concerns the allocation of
prot surplus or cost savings among the n players who cooperate to achieve the
surplus or savings. For our credit card network involving a merchant, an acquirer,
and an issuer, we nd that, when the three rms cooperate for the credit card
business, they can jointly achieve the prot generated by the business. But,
two critical questions arise as follows: how can the prot be divided among
the three rms in a fair manner? and how can the three rms implement a
fair allocation scheme? To address the former question, we shall construct a
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three-player cooperative game and solve it for a fair allocation scheme. Since the
merchant pays the merchant discount fee to the acquirer who pays the interchange
fee to the issuer, we nd that an interchange fee rate and a merchant discount
rate corresponds to an allocation scheme. For example, a higher value of the
interchange fee rate results in more allocation to the issuer; similarly, increasing
the merchant discount rate may raise the allocation to the acquirer. That is, given
specic values of the two rates, we can compute the corresponding allocation
scheme.
Next, we provide an approach to nd the rates assuring that the grand coali-
tion is stable; for similar approaches, see, e.g., Petrosjan and Zaccour [26], Sexton
[30], etc. Specically, in order to nd the negotiated rates for the credit card net-
work, we should consider the following two steps:
Step 1: Construct a cooperative game given the rates in the grand
coalition. In this step, we construct a three-player cooperative game with the
characteristic values in terms of the interchange fee rate and the merchant dis-
count rate in the grand coalition, which are assumed to be given.
Step 2: Search for the rates that assure the stability of the grand
coalition. We solve the cooperative game to nd a fair allocation scheme and the
corresponding rates, assuring that the grand coalition is stable. We rst derive the
conditions for the non-empty core, in which each point represents a fair allocation
scheme. In order to nd a unique solution, we then compute Shapley value and
the corresponding rates for the cooperative game. Note that (i) Shapley value-
based rates may not satisfy the conditions that assure the non-emptiness of the
core, and (ii) Shapley value may not be in the core even if the core is non-empty.
Thus, we need to examine whether or not Shapley value can be used to nd the
rates that result in the stability of the grand coalition. If Shapley value cannot
assure that the grand coalition is stable, then we consider another important
and common solution concept of nucleolus,which must exist in a non-empty
core. We shall develop an algorithm to nd the rates satisfying the conditions for
the non-emptiness of the core.
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Following the above two steps, we next develop a three-player cooperative
game, and derive an interchange fee rate and a merchant discount rate that result
in a fair allocation scheme assuring the stability of the grand coalition.
4.1 The Three-Player Cooperative Game Given the Rates
in the Grand Coalition
To construct a three-player cooperative game where any two or all of three credit
card members (i.e., the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant) can negotiate with
each other and form various coalitions, we should compute the characteristic val-
ues of all possible coalitions. Note that the characteristic value of a coalition is
the minimum prot that all members in the coalition can jointly achieve by using
their own e¤orts only; see von Neumann and Morgenstern [41] . For our credit
card network, the characteristic value of a coalition is dened as the total prot
that all players in the coalition could jointly achieve when they are involved in
the credit card business. All possible coalitions for our three-player cooperative
game involves (i) the empty coalition f?g, which means that no player consid-
ers the credit card business; (ii) three single-player coalitions fig (i = M;A; I),
which mean that only the rm i is involved in the business; (iii) three two-player
coalitions fijg (i; j = M;A; I, i 6= j), which represent the coalitions each involv-
ing the two rms i and j for the credit card business; and (iv) the three-player
(grand) coalition fMAIg in which all of three players cooperate to implement
the credit card business.
According to the above, our three-player cooperative game in the characteristic-
function form includes the following characteristic values: v(?); v(M), v(A), v(I);
v(MA), v(MI), v(AI); and v(MAI). Next, we calculate these values to specify
our cooperative game, and solve it to nd a fair allocation scheme. Since the
prot generated by the empty coalition ? is naturally zero, we have v(?) = 0.
We also note from the practice that, as usual, the acquirer and the issuer which
are two banks cannot participate in the retailing business and sell any products
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to consumers. Since the acquirer and the issuer prot from the merchant discount
fee and the interchange fee, respectively, their prots are both zero when the mer-
chant doesnt accept the credit card payments of its customers. Therefore, if the
merchant doesnt join the credit card network, then either the acquirer or the
issuer or both of them cannot achieve any prot from the credit card business;
that is, v(A) = v(I) = v(AI) = 0.
However, we nd that any coalition involving the merchant may gain the
prot induced by customerspurchases with their credit cards. More specically,
in the coalition fMg, the merchant (e.g., JUSCO) itself issues its store credit
cards (e.g., the AEON credit card by JUSCO), and thus acts as the acquirer
and issuerbesides operating normally as a retailing system. In addition, the
merchant may only cooperate with the issuer to form the two-player coalition
fMIg for the credit card business; for example, as an issuer, the Citibank issues
the store-labeled credit card for the Sears, which is one of the largest retailer in the
North America. Similarly, the merchant may form the two-player coalition fMAg
with the acquirer for the credit card business. For example, the General Electric
Money Bank is the bank of the Wal-Mart, and is thus considered as the acquirer,
who also issues the Wal-Mart Discover credit card to individual customers. This
means that the bank does not only play the role of the acquirer but also acts
as the issuer. The most common credit card network in reality is that involving
a merchant, an acquirer, and an issuer. That is, the grand coalition fMAIg is
a common form adopted by banks and retailers to implement their credit card
business. For example, in addition to the Wal-Mart Discover credit card, the
Wal-Mart also accepts other credit cards (e.g., Visa, MasterCard, etc.) issued by
other banks such as the Citibank. For a further discussion on the above, see, e.g.,
Akers et al. [1] that considered three networks including (i) fMg; (ii) fMAg and
fMIg; and (iii) fMAIg.
Next, we compute the characteristic values v(M), v(MA), v(MI), and v(MAI),
in order to develop our three-player cooperative game model.
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4.1.1 The Characteristic Value v(M)
We now calculate the characteristic value of the coalition fMg where the mer-
chant itself operates the credit card business by also acting as an issuerand an
acquirer.As discussed previously, this case may happen in reality. For example,
the Japan United Stores Company (JUSCO) is a well-known chain of general
merchandise storesin Japan; and the various JUSCO companies are subsidiaries
of AEON Japan Group. In 1981, the AEON group established the AEON Credit
Japan, which has become one of the largest credit card issuers in Japan. For
over 12 years, the AEON Credit Japan and the JUSCO companies have jointly
launched a variety of co-branded credit cards that are labeled with AEON,
JUSCO, and a credit card company/network (e.g., Visa, MasterCard, Ameri-
can Express, etc.) which the AEON Credit Japan and JUSCO companies join.
Note that, even though the AEON and JUSCO join credit card networks such
as Visa and MasterCard, they still dont cooperate with any external acquirers
and issuers but process credit card transactions by themselves. This helps attract
more customers to buy at the JUSCO stores. For more information regarding the
AEON JUSCO credit cards, see, e.g., a report by the Kenanga Research company
[17].
As the above indicates, a merchant (e.g., JUSCO) may operate its own credit
card service, which means that the merchant also acts as an issuer and an acquirer.
To calculate v(M) for our three-player cooperative game, we should observe the
merchants operation cost induced by taking the roles of the issuer and the ac-
quirer. Recall from Section 3 that an external acquirer and an external issuer
incur the per dollar operation costs cA and cI , respectively, when they process
credit card transactions. We assume that, when the merchant operates the busi-
ness by itself, it absorbs the per dollar operation cost cA for its acquirerrole
and the per dollar cost cI for its issuerrole. It is also assumed that the pa-
rameters  and  are both greater than or equal to 1; this is justied as follows:
In practice, acquirers and issuers are usually nancial banks that are specialized
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with the operational process of credit card transactions. Moreover, those banks
process a very large transaction amount, which can reduce their operation costs
because of the economics of scales. Thus, acquirers and issuers should be able
to process the transactions more e¢ ciently than the merchant operating its own
credit card program; and it is reasonable to assume that ;   1.
Next, we compute the merchants maximum prot v(M) in the coalition fMg,
where the merchant operates the credit card program by itself and thus doesnt
need to consider the merchant discount fee and the interchange fee. Since, as
discussed above, the merchant absorbs the per dollar operation cost cA + cI
(which happens because the merchant takes the roles of the acquirer and the
issuer), the merchant can attain the prot (1   cA   cI) from an one-dollar
transaction. The merchant sells n products with the retail price p  (p1; : : : ; pn)
to customers whose aggregate (price-dependent) demand for product i is qi(pi) =
i   ipi, as given in (1). Hence, the merchants prot from the credit card
transaction is computed as (1 cA cI)
Pn
i=1[piqi(pi)]. Because the merchants
unit acquisition cost is ci for product i, its total acquisition cost is
Pn
i=1[ciqi(pi)].
According to the above, we calculate the merchants net prot for the coalition
fMg as M1(p) =
Pn
i=1f[(1   cA   cI)  pi   ci]  qi(pi)g, which, using (1),
can be re-written as,
M1(p) =
Xn
i=1
f[(1  cA   cI)pi   ci] (i   ipi)g. (23)
In order to assure the non-negativity of M1(p) in (23), we assume that 1  cA+
cI and the merchant determines its prices such that i=i  pi  ci=(1  cA  
cI), for i = 1; : : : ; n. Next, we maximize M1(p) in (23) under the constraint
that i=i  pi  ci=(1   cA   cI) to nd the merchants optimal pricing
decision for the case that the merchant doesnt cooperate with other rms but
joins the single-player coalition fMg.
Theorem 6 In the coalition fMg, the merchants optimal pricing decision is
pM1 = (pM11 ; : : : ; p
M1
n ), where p
M1
i (i = 1; : : : ; n) is the optimal retail price for
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product i and can be obtained as a unique solution of the following equation:
pM1i =
1
2

i
i
+
ci
1  cA   cI

, for i = 1; : : : ; n. J (24)
Comparing pi(d) in Theorem 1 with p
M1
i in the above theorem, we nd that
the merchants optimal retail price pM1i (i = 1; : : : ; n) in the coalition fMg is
greater than the Stackelberg equilibrium price pSi for our two-stage game problem
in Section 3, if the merchants credit card operation cost cA + cI is less than
the Stackelberg equilibrium merchant discount fee dS that is regarded as the
cost of the merchant in the two-stage game setting. That is, when cA +
cI < d
S, the merchant should have an incentive to undertake the credit card
business instead of outsourcingsuch a business to the acquirer and the issuer
and being thus engaged in the two-stage game problem. Since cA + cI < dS, as
discussed in Section 3, the parameters  and  play an important role in a¤ecting
the merchants willingness to hold the credit card business. Specically, if the
merchant is su¢ ciently e¢ cient in the credit card business, then both  and 
should be small enough to assure that cA + cI < dS, and the merchant should
be inclined to operate the credit card business rather than to subcontract the
nancial service out to the acquirer and the issuer. Noting that, in practice,
the majority of merchants are specialized in the retailing service rather than the
nancial service, we conclude that only the large-scale merchants which include,
e.g., JUSCO, as an example for the coalition fMgmay consider the credit card
business, whereas the other merchants (especially, small-scale merchants) may
have to rely on the acquirer and the issuer as in the two-stage game setting.
Substituting pM1i in (24) into the demand function qi(pi) = i   ipi and
simplifying it we have,
qi(p
M1
i ) =
1
2

i   ici
1  cA   cI

, for i = 1; : : : ; n. (25)
Next, we compute the characteristic value of the coalition fMg. Letting pM1 
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(pM11 ; : : : ; p
M1
n ) and using the optimal retail price p
M1
i in (24) and qi(p
M1
i ) in (25),
we nd that
v(M) = M1(p
M1) =
1
4
Xn
i=1
[i(1  cA   cI)  ici]2
i(1  cA   cI)
 0. (26)
4.1.2 The Characteristic Value v(MI)
In the coalition fMIg, the merchant cooperates with the issuer to process con-
sumerspayments with the merchant-labeled credit cards issued by the issuer.
For this coalition, the issuer also acts as an acquirer, since, as the merchants
bank, the issuer now also processes the cardholders(consumers) bills and directly
deposits their payments (excluding the interchange fee) into the merchants ac-
count. For example, the Citibank has issued the Sears credit cards since the Sear
sold its retail credit card operations to the Citibank in 2003 [43]. As the Citibank
has taken over the Searss retail credit card operations, the Sears is no more in-
volved in the nancial process of any credit card transactions. The Citibank now
acts as an issuer as well as an acquirer to transfer relevant transaction amount
to the Searscorporate account at the Citibank. For more discussions and other
examples (e.g., Macys), see DeGennaro [9].
Since a single nancial bank takes the roles of the issuer and the acquirer, we
do not need to consider the merchant discount rate for the coalition fMIg because
the issuer charges the merchant (rather than an acquirer) for the interchange fee.
Thus, the issuer and the merchant negotiate the interchange fee rate f , and the
merchant then makes its retail pricing decisions. The above is actually a two-
stage game problem, which is similar to that in Section 3. To solve the problem
and calculate the characteristic value v(MI), we next (i) nd the best-response
retail prices for the merchant, assuming that the interchange fee rate f is given;
(ii) develop the merchants and the issuersprot functions, construct an NBS
model, and calculate the NBS-characterized interchange fee rate fMI ; and (iii)
substitute fMI into the merchants best-response function, and then calculate two
playerscorresponding prot functions and sum them to nd the value v(MI).
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Merchants Best-Response Pricing Decision in the Coalition fMIg We
now nd the merchants best-response pricing decision for a given value of the
interchange fee rate f . When the merchant joins the coalition fMIg, it has the
sale revenue
Pn
i=1[pi qi(pi)] but incurs the interchange fee f 
Pn
i=1[pi qi(pi)]
and the acquisition cost
Pn
i=1[ci qi(pi)]. Thus, the merchants net prot for the
coalition fMIg is calculated as M2(p) =
Pn
i=1f[(1  f)pi  ci] qi(pi)g. Similar
to Section 3, we assume that, in order to assure the non-negativity of M2(p),
the merchant determines its prices such that pi  ci=(1   f), for i = 1; : : : ; n.
Recalling from Section 3.1.1 that pi  i=i (i = 1; : : : ; n), we nd that the
merchants price pi (i = 1; : : : ; n) should be in the range [ci=(1  f); i=i].
Using (1), we re-write the merchants prot function M2(p) as,
M2(p) =
Xn
i=1
f[(1  f)i + ici] pi   (1  f)ip2i   icig.
Next, we maximize the above under the constraint that ci=(1  f)  pi  i=i
(for i = 1; : : : ; n) to nd the merchants best-response pricing decision.
Theorem 7 Given the interchange fee rate f , the merchants best-response retail
pricing decision is pM2(f)  (pM21 (f); : : : ; pM2n (f)), where pM2i (f) is the best-
response price for product i (i = 1; : : : ; n) and is computed as,
pM2i (f) =
1
2

i
i
+
ci
(1  f)

, for i = 1; : : : ; n. J (27)
The NBS-Based Interchange Fee Rate for the Coalition fMIg Using
the best-response retail price pM2(f) (as given in Theorem 7), we calculate the
merchants corresponding sale revenue R(pM2(f)) and prot M2(p
M2(f)) as,
R(pM2(f)) =
Xn
i=1

pM2i (f) qi(pM2i (f))

=
1
4

!1   !2
(1  f)2

, (28)
M2(p
M2(f)) =
1
4

!1(1  f) + !2
1  f   2
Xn
i=1
(ici)

=
1
4
Xn
i=1
[i(1  f)  ici]2
i(1  f)
. (29)
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where !1 and !2 are given as in (7).
Theorem 8 If and only if f  cA + cI , then M2(pM2(f))  v(M), where
v(M) is given as in (26). J
As the above theorem indicates, the merchant should have an incentive to
leave the coalition fMg for the coalition fMIg, when the merchants per dollar
operation cost cA + cI is no less than the negotiated interchange fee rate f .
This happens because of the following fact: Recall from Section 4.1.1 that, if the
merchant operates the credit card business by its own e¤ort rather than with the
cooperation of the issuer, then the merchant incurs the per dollar operation cost
cA+cI . Otherwise, if the merchant joins the coalition fMIg to cooperate with
the issuer, then it doesnt absorb the cost cA + cI but needs to pay the rate f
to the issuer. Therefore, in order to assure the stability of the coalition fMIg,
the negotiated rate f must be smaller than or equal to cA + cI .
Next, for the coalition fMIg, we assume that the issuer incurs a per dollar
operation cost cI for the issuer-related operations and a per dollar operation cost
cA (where   1) for the acquirer-related operations. The parameter  helps
distinguish the issuer acting as an acquirer and the external acquirer specialized in
the relevant operations. Similar to Section 3.2.1, the issuer attains the interchange
fee f  R(pM2(f)) but absorbs the per dollar operation cost cI  R(pM2(f))
(incurred for the issuer-related operations) and also the per dollar operation cost
  cA  R(pM2(f)) (incurred for the acquirers operations). Hence, the issuers
prot is calculated as,
I2(f) = (f   cI   cA)R(pM2(f))
=
1
4
(f   cI   cA)

!1   !2
(1  f)2

, (30)
which is non-negative if and only if cI + cA  f  1  
p
!2=!1, because both
(f   cI   cA) and R(pM2(f)) must be non-negative. Therefore, to assure that
I2(f)  0, we assume that cI + cA  1 
p
!2=!1.
36
We then construct the NBS model to characterize the bargaining process
between the issuer and the merchant. Note that, if the merchant doesnt cooperate
with the issuer, then it launches the credit card business and gains the prot
v(M), as discussed in Section 4.1.1. Therefore, the merchants security level
(status quo point) is v(M). But, if the issuer doesnt join the coalition fMIg,
then its prot v(I) is zero and its security level is zero. Using the above, similar
to Section 3.2.1, the NBS model for the coalition fMIg is developed as,
maxf 
MI = [M2(p
M2(f))  v(M)] I2(f)
s.t. M2(p
M2(f))  v(M) and I2(f)  0.
(31)
We learn from Theorem 8 that M2(p
M2(f))  v(M) i¤ f  cA + cI . We also
nd from our above discussion that I2(f)  0 i¤ cI + cA  f  1  
p
!2=!1.
Thus, we can re-write the constraints in the maximization problem (31) as, cI +
cA  f  min(cA+cI ; 1 
p
!2=!1); and as a result, our maximization problem
can re-written as,
maxf 
MI = [M2(p
M2(f))  v(M)] I2(f)
s.t. cI + cA  f  min(cA + cI ; 1 
p
!2=!1).
(32)
Theorem 9 There is a unique solution for the maximization problem in (32).
That is, for the coalition fMIg, the NBS-characterized interchange fee rate fMI
uniquely exists. J
Calculation of the Characteristic Value v(MI) Replacing the rate f in
pM2i (f) (i = 1; : : : ; n) and M2(p
M2(f)) [given by (27) and (28), respectively]
with the negotiated rate fMI (given in Theorem 9) and simplifying them, we nd
the merchants optimal retail pricing decision and its maximum prot as,
pM2i (f
MI) =
1
2

i
i
+
ci
(1  fMI)

, for i = 1; : : : ; n;
M2(p
M2(fMI)) =
1
4
Xn
i=1
(
i(1  fMI)  ici
2
i(1  fMI)
)
. (33)
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Similarly, using fMI , we calculate the issuers corresponding maximum prot as,
I2(f
MI) =
fMI   cI   cA
4

!1   !2
(1  fMI)2

. (34)
Following along the lines similar to those in Theorem 6, we nd that, if the issuer
can e¢ ciently act as an acquirer,then the merchant and the issuer may decide
to operate the credit card business without subcontracting the acquirer-related
operations out to the acquirer as in the two-stage game setting that is discussed
in Section 3. We compute the characteristic value v(MI) as M2(p
M2(fMI)) +
I2(f
MI); that is,
v(MI) =
1
2
nX
i=1

i   ici
1  fMI

1  cI   cA
2

i
i
+
ci
1  fMI

  ci

 v(M). (35)
4.1.3 The Characteristic Value v(MA)
In the coalition fMAg, the merchant and the acquirer cooperate for the credit
card business. This coalition exists in practice. For example, as the bank where
Wal-Mart opens its account, the General Electric (GE) Money Bank issues the
Wal-Mart Discover credit card, acting as both the acquirer and the issuer. The
game for this coalition is described as follows: The merchant and the acquirer rst
negotiate the merchant discount rate. Then, the merchant makes its own pricing
decisions. Similar to the above, we still use the backward induction approach to
nd the value v(MA).
Given the merchant discount rate d, the merchants optimal retail prices can
be found by maximizing its protM3(p) =
Pn
i=1 [(1  d) pi   ci] (i   ipi).
We learn from Theorem 1 that the optimal retail price of product i in the coalition
fMAg is pM3i (d) = [i=i + ci=(1   d)]=2, for i = 1; : : : ; n. Letting pM3(d) 
(pM31 (d); : : : ; p
M3
n (d)), we have,
R(d) =
1
4

!1   !2
(1  d)2

and M3(p
M3(d)) =
1
4
nX
i=1
[(1  d)i   ici]2
i(1  d)
. (36)
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Theorem 10 M3(p
M3(d))  v(M) if and only if d  cA + cI .
The above theorem indicates that, when the merchants per dollar operation
cost cA + cI is no less than the negotiated merchant discount rate d, the mer-
chant should have an incentive to leave the coalition fMg and join the coalition
fMAg. The justication for this theorem is similar to that for Theorem 7. For
the coalition fMAg, the acquirer is assumed to incur a per dollar operation cost
cA for the acquirer-related operations and a per dollar operation cost cI (where
  1) for the issuer-related operations. The acquirers prot A3(d) is thus
calculated as,
A3(d) = (d  cA   cI)R(d) =
d  cA   cI
4

!1   !2
(1  d)2

, (37)
which is non-negative i¤ cA + cI  d  1 
p
!2=!1.
Then, we use the NBS to determine the merchant discount rate as a result
of the negotiation between the acquirer and the merchant; that is, we can nd
the NBS-based solution by maximizing MA = [M3(p
M3(d))   v(M)]  A3(d)
subject to M3(p
M3(d))  v(M) and A3(d)  0, where, using our arguments
for the coalition fMAg, we nd that the security levels for the merchant and the
acquirer are v(M) and zero, respectively. Using A3(d) in (37) and Theorem 10,
we can re-write the NBS optimization problem as
maxd 
MA = [M3(p
M3(d))  v(M)] A3(d)
s.t. cA + cI  d  min(cA + cI ; 1 
p
!2=!1):
(38)
Theorem 11 MA is quasi-concave in d; thus, a unique NBS-characterized mer-
chant discount rate dMA must exist for the coalition fMAg.
Using similar lines as those in Theorem 6, we nd that whether or not
the acquirer and the merchant are willing to undertake the credit card busi-
ness by themselves depends on the acquirers e¢ ciency in acting as an is-
suer in the coalition fMAg. Specically, only when the negotiated rate dMA
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is less than the Stackelberg equilibrium merchant discount fee dS in the two-
stage game setting, the merchant and the acquirer should have an incentive to
cooperate in the coalition fMAg. Substituting dMA into the merchants and the
acquirers prot functions gives the characteristic value of the coalition fMAg as
v(MA) = M3(p
M3(dMA)) + A3(d
MA); that is,
v(MA) =
1
2
nX
i=1

1  cA   cI
2

2i
i
+
ic
2
i
(1  dMA)2

  ici

i
i
+
ci(d
MA   cA   cI)
(1  dMA)2

 v(M). (39)
4.1.4 The Characteristic Value v(MAI)
We now calculate the characteristic value of the grand coalition fMAIg, where the
merchant, the acquirer and the issuer cooperate for the credit card business. This
coalition is the most common in practice; for instance, Wal-Mart who opens its
account at the GE Money Bank accepts the payments by the customers using
the credit cards issued by the Citibank. In this example, Wal-Mart, the GE
Money Bank and the Citibank are the merchant, the acquirer and the issuer,
respectively. After joining the grand coalition, the three rms bargain over both
the interchange fee rate f and the merchant discount rate d. Observing the
negotiated rates fMAI and dMAI , the merchant determines optimal retail prices
pM4(dMAI) = (pM41 (d
MAI); : : : ; pM4n (d
MAI)).
One may note that the grand coalition fMAIg is similar to the two-stage game
problem that we analyze in Section 3. Even though, in the coalition fMAIg, the
three rms also cooperate to operate the credit card business, we consider a
di¤erent approach to determine the rates f and d. More specically, in our two-
stage game problem, f is negotiated only by the acquirer and the issuer, and d is
determined by the acquirer, whereas, in the coalition fMAIg, both f and d are
dependent on the negotiation among the merchant, the acquirer, and the issuer.
Similar to Sections 4.1.14.1.3, we rst calculate the merchants best-response
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pricing decision pM4(d) for any given values of f and d, which is obtained by
solving the following constrained maximization problem:
max
pi, i=1;:::;n
M4(p) =
Xn
i=1
[(1  d)pi   ci] qi(pi), s.t., ci=(1  d)  pi  i=i.
Using Theorem 1, we nd that pM4(d) = (pM41 (d); : : : ; p
M4
n (d)) where p
M4
i (d) =
[i=i + ci=(1  d)]=2, for i = 1; : : : ; n.
We learn from Section 3 that the merchants, the acquirers, and the issuers
prot functions are,
M4(d) = (1  d)R(d) 
Xn
i=1
[ci  qi(pM4i (d))],
A4(d) = (d  f   cA)R(d) and I4(f) = (f   cI)R(d),
where R(d) =
Pn
i=1[p
M4
i (d) qi(pM4i (d))] is the sale revenue realized by the mer-
chant. Thus, the characteristic value v(MAI) which is dened as the three
rmstotal prot is computed as,
v(MAI) = M4(d) + A4(d) + I4(f)
=
Xn
i=1

i   ici
1  d

1  cA   cI
4

i
i
+
ci
1  d

  ci
2

. (40)
For the grand coalition fMAIg, the interchange fee rate and the merchant
discount rate are negotiated by the merchant, the acquirer, and the issuer. Thus,
even though v(MAI) [as given in (40)] is dependent on merchant discount rate
d, we cannot maximize v(MAI) to nd the merchant discount rate but have to
calculate it by solving a three-player cooperative game model that characterizes
the bargaining process arising among the three rms. Next, we use the theory of
cooperative games to nd the rates d and f for the grand coalition fMAIg.
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4.2 The Analysis of the Three-Player Cooperative Game
for the Rates Assuring the Stability of the Grand
Coalition
For our credit card network, we have developed the three-player cooperative game
G = (N; v) where N = fM;A; Ig and the characteristic values of all possible
coalitions are computed as follows: v(?) = v(A) = v(I) = v(AI) = 0, and v(M),
v(MI), v(MA), and v(MAI) are given as in (26), (35), (39), and (40), respec-
tively. In this section, we solve this game to obtain a unique allocation scheme and
compute the corresponding interchange fee rate and merchant discount rate. Note
that, in this thesis, the merchant, the acquirer and the issuer implement the allo-
cation scheme by determining the interchange fee rate and merchant discount rate.
Prior to nding an allocation scheme, we next discuss whether or not our coop-
erative game in the characteristic-function form is superadditive and convex. The
cooperative game G with 3 players is superadditive if v(C1 [C2)  v(C1) + v(C2)
for any two disjoint coalitions C1 and C2 in the three-player game; for details,
see, for example, Stra¢ n [35]. Moreover, the game is convex if it is supermodular.
According to Shapley [32], we nd that our three-player cooperative games char-
acteristic function is supermodular if v(S [ T ) + v(S \ T )  v(S) + v(T ), for all
S, T  N . Note that a cooperative game is convex and also superadditive if its
characteristic function is supermodular ; for more information, see, e.g., Driessen
[10], Topkis [37], etc. Next, we examine the supermodularity of the characteristic
function for our game.
4.2.1 Supermodularity and the Core
We now derive the su¢ cient conditions under which our three-player cooperative
game is supermodular, and also nd the su¢ cient conditions that assure the
existence of a non-empty core for our game.
Theorem 12 If the merchant discount rate d is negotiated such that v(MAI) +
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v(M)  v(MA) + v(MI), then our three-player cooperative game is supermodu-
lar. J
In the su¢ cient condition given by the above theorem, v(MI)  v(M) means
the additionalprot generated when the issuer participates in the credit card
business by undertaking both the issuer- and the acquirer-related operations.
Moreover, v(MAI)  v(MA) represents the additionalprot generated by the
participation of the issuer who only operates the issuer-related business while
the acquirer exists in the credit card network. That is, the su¢ cient condi-
tion in Theorem 12 implies that the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant can
jointly achieve a higher prot from the credit card business (i.e., the game is
supermodular and thus superadditive), if the issuers contribution is greater
when the acquirer serves the credit card network than when the acquirer is not
involved in such a business. Furthermore, one may note that the su¢ cient con-
dition that v(MAI)   v(MA)  v(MI)   v(M) can be equivalently re-written
as v(MAI)  v(MI)  v(MA)  v(M). Using our above argument, we can also
conclude that the three rms can enjoy a higher system-wide prot, if the ac-
quirers contribution is greater when the issuer exists in the credit card network
than when the issuer is not involved.
In addition to the above, we nd that the merchant should be always involved
in the credit card business, even though both the issuer and the acquirer are
important to the protability and e¢ ciency of the credit card network. The
reason is given as follows: if the merchant does not join the network, then both
the issuer and the acquirer cannot gain any prot from the credit card business
since they, as two nancial rms, could not play as the role of an merchantto
realize the sale revenue in the retailing market.
Remark 3 We nd that the merchants participation in the credit card network
is signicantly important to the success of the network. Moreover, the issuer
and the acquirer may need to have su¢ cient expertise in the issuer- and the
acquirer-related business, respectively, in order to make the network-wide prot
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higher than when the merchant operates the credit card business by itself or
delegates the business to either the issuer or the acquirer. We also learn from
Theorem 12 that the issuer and the acquirer should both operate in the credit
card network, in order to improve the protability of the network. This implies
that the popularity of the credit card service in the nancial market could be
important to the success of the recent U.S. bill Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2009
(H.R. 2695), in which the merchant is encouraged to participate in the credit
card network for the negotiation of the interchange fee rate and the merchant
discount rate. J
When our cooperative game is supermodular, it has a non-empty core where
there exist a set of fair allocation schemes each assuring the stability of the
grand coalition fMAIg [12]. Letting yi denote the prot allocated to rm i,
i 2 N = fM;A; Ig, we can call a proper allocation scheme y  (yM ; yA; yI)
where yM = M4(d), yA = A4(d), and yI = I4(f) an imputation for our
game G = (N; v(:)), if the scheme satises the following two properties: (i) in-
dividual rationality, i.e., yi  v(i), for all i 2 N ; and (ii) collective rationality,
i.e.,
P
i2N yi = v(MAI) [35]. The core is the set of all undominated imputations
(fair allocation schemes) (yM ; yA; yI) such that
P
i2T yi  v(T ) for all coalitions
T  N = fM;A; Ig.
Even though a supermodular game must have a non-empty core, we cannot
conclude that the core is empty for the non-supermodular game. In the following
theorem, we provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions under which our cooper-
ative game has a non-empty core.
Theorem 13 The core of our cooperative game is non-empty if and only if fMI 
cA  f and f + dMA   cI  d  min(dMA; fMI).
The above theorem implies that, as the merchant joins the grand coalition
fMAIg and bargains with the acquirer and the issuer over the merchant dis-
count rate and the interchange fee rate, the negotiated interchange fee rate and
merchant discount rate are no more than dMA and fMI , respectively. That is,
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the two rates are reduced as a result of the negotiation among the issuer, the
acquirer, and the merchant.
As Theorem 13 indicates, the interchange fee rate f must be greater than or
equal to fMI   cA. We learn from Section 4.1.2 that fMI is the rate paid by
the merchant to the issuer in the coalition fMIg, where the issuer absorbs the
unit cost cA in undertaking the acquirer-related operations. This implies that
fMI   cA represents the issuers unit net gainresulting from its own (issuer-
related) operations. Thus, the condition that fMI   cA  f assures that the
issuer is willing to join the grand coalition fMAIg. Similarly, in the two-player
coalition fMAg, the acquirers unit net gainresulting from its own (acquirer-
related) operations is dMA   cI . To assure that the acquirer has an incentive to
join the grand coalition fMAIg, we should determine the merchant discount rate
d such that the acquirers unit net gain (d f) in fMAIg is no less than dMA cI ,
i.e., f+dMA cI  d. In addition, we nd that the merchant pays the rates dMA
and fMI in the two-player coalitions fMAg and fMIg, respectively. In order to
entice the merchant to stay in the grand coalition, we should choose the merchant
discount rate that is lower than both dMA and fMI , i.e., d  min(dMA; fMI).
According to the above discussion, we draw the following insights.
Remark 4 The grand coalition is more likely to be stable, if each player (i.e.,
the merchant, the acquirer, or the issuer) is larger and more specialized in its
own operation for the credit card business. The justication is given as follows:
Theorem 13 implies that, in the credit card network, all of the three players are
willing to join the grand coalition, if and only if the deviation of any one player
from the grand coalition shall make the remaining two players worse o¤. That is,
if each two-player coalition can achieve a signicantly high prot (characteristic
value), then the grand coalition is unlikely to be stable. Recall that the prot
of the coalition fAIg is zero. From Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3, we learn that the
prots of the coalitions fMIg and fMAg could be small if the values of the scale
parameters   1 and   1 are signicantly high, respectively. Therefore, in
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the credit card network with the high values of  and , neither the two-player
coalition fMIg nor fMAg would be stable and instead, the grand coalition is
likely to be stable. Note that the scale parameter  reects the operation e¢ ciency
of the issuer or the merchant in acting as an acquirer;and, the scale parameter
 reects the operation e¢ ciency of the acquirer or the merchant in acting as an
issuer.That is, if the merchant, the acquirer, and the issuer are larger and more
specialized in their own operations for the credit card business, then it should be
more costly for the issuer and the merchant (the acquirer and the merchant) to
take the role of an acquirer (issuer), the value of  () is higher, and the
grand coalition is more likely to be stable. J
The above remark implies that the recent U.S. bill Credit Card Fair Fee Act of
2009 (H.R. 2695)should be more e¤ective, if, in credit card networks, the banks
and the merchants are larger and more specialized in their own operations. This
result could be justied by the fact that, in the United States, the participants
in the negotiation of the merchant discount rate and the interchange fee rate are
usually the large, highly-specialized banks (e.g., Citibank) and merchants (e.g.,
Wal-Mart). In fact, many small merchants in practice may be unwilling or against
to accept the credit cards; see Tozzi [38] and Trichur [39]. Letting
  f(d; f)jf + dMA   cI  d  min(dMA; fMI) and fMI   cA  fg, (41)
we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2 If  > 1, then the set  is non-empty and thus, the interchange
fee rate and the merchant discount rate in  can assure that the corresponding
allocation scheme is in the core and the grand coalition fMAIg is stable. However,
if  = 1, then both the set  and the core are empty.
In this thesis,  is assumed to be greater than 1, because, as discussed previ-
ously, the acquirer/merchant incurs a higher operation cost when acting as an
issuer.We also note that, if  = 1, then cA + cI  fMI  cA +cI = dMA. Thus,
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d = fMI and f = fMI   cA should belong to the set .
4.2.2 The Unique Fair Allocation Scheme
Since the core includes many allocation schemes rather than only a unique scheme,
one may need to make a decision on which imputation in the core to be chosen
to allocate the prot v(MAI). Shapley value [31] and the nucleolus [29] are the
two most commonly-used solutions in cooperative game theory. We thus apply
both of them to derive a unique allocation solution and its corresponding rates d
and f .
We now nd a unique fair allocation scheme for our cooperative game, which
is in a non-empty core of our game. We learn from Corollary 2 that there must
exist (d; f) satisfying the conditions in (41), which assures that our game has
a non-empty core. Note that any imputation in the core corresponds to a fair
allocation scheme. Next, we nd a unique merchant discount rate d and a unique
interchange fee rate f to assure that the core is non-empty and the corresponding
allocation scheme is the non-empty core.
In Leng and Parlar [18], Leng and Parlar described major concepts in cooper-
ative game theory, and concluded that Shapley value (Shapley [31]) and nucleolus
(Schmeidler [29]) are the two commonly-used solutions each representing a unique
allocation scheme. Shapley value can be computed easily by using a formula re-
gardless of whether or not the core is empty, and also, it is a unique, monotonic
solution; see, Megiddo [24] and Young [45]. The monotonicity of a solution means
that, if the prot achieved by each possible coalition increases, then the prot
allocation to each player should be also increased. But, Shapley value has the
following weakness: it may not be in the core even though the core is non-empty.
Compared with Shapley value, the nucleolus also exists in the non-empty core;
but, this solution concept has been found by solving a series of linear problems.
Thus, for the purpose of easy computation, we prefer Shapley value to the nucleo-
lus for the calculation of the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate.
But, if Shapley value is not in the core, then we should consider the nucleolus.
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Shapley Value For our three-player cooperative game, the unique Shapley
value (M ; A; I) is computed as i =
P
i2T (jT j   1)!(n   jT j)![v(T )   v(T  
fig)]=(n!), where T denotes a possible coalition that the rm i (i = M;A; I) joins,
and jT j is the size of T . More specically, the unique allocation scheme in terms
of Shapley value is given as,
8>>>><>>>>:
M =
2v(MAI) + 2v(M) + v(MA) + v(MI)
6
;
A =
2v(MAI)  v(M) + v(MA)  2v(MI)
6
;
I =
2v(MAI)  v(M) + v(MI)  2v(MA)
6
.
(42)
As discussed previously, the allocation to the merchant, that to the acquirer, and
that to the issuer are M4(d), A4(d) and I4(f), respectively, because the three
rms implement the allocation scheme by determining d and f . That is, we can
solve the equations fM4(d) = M and A4(d) = Ag where M4(d) and A4(d)
are given in Section 4.1.4 to nd the Shapley value-based merchant discount
rate dSP and the Shapley value-based interchange fee rate fSP . Note that we
dont need to condition the equation that I4(f
SP ) = I , because M4(d
SP ) +
A4(d
SP ) + I4(f
SP ) = M + A + I = v(MAI).
However, when we use Shapley value-characterized allocation scheme to nd
dSP and fSP , we cannot assure that the values of dSP and fSP are in the set
 in (41). If the Shapley value-based dSP and fSP doesnt belong to the set ,
then the core may be empty and the grand coalition fMAIg may not be stable.
Therefore, if Shapley value cannot assure the stability of the grand coalition, then
we should apply the nucleolus to our calculation.
To illustrate the above, we provide two numerical examples including one with
empty core and the other with non-empty core.
Example 2 We use the parameter values for the three-product case in Example
1. Moreover, we assume that the parameters  and  are 10 and 9, respec-
tively. Note from Section 4.1 that, in our three-player cooperative game model,
v(?) = v(A) = v(I) = v(AI) = 0; and we need to calculate the characteristic
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values v(M), v(MA), v(MI), and v(MAI). According to Theorem 24, we nd
that, in the coalition fMg, the merchants optimal prices for three products are
p1 = 112:946, p2 = 115:960, and p3 = 116:920. Then, using (26) we compute
the characteristic value v(M) as 25:409. Next, we solve the NBS models in (32)
and (38), and nd the NBS-characterized interchange fee rate for the coalition
fMIg and merchant discount rate for the coalition fMAg as fMI = 7:507%
and dMA = 7:704%, respectively. It thus follows that the characteristic val-
ues of the coalitions fMIg and fMAg are calculated as v(MI) = 76:389 and
v(MA) = 72:410, respectively. Using the above, our three-player cooperative
game is constructed as follows:
v(?) = 0; v(A) = v(I) = 0, v(M) = 25:409;
v(AI) = 0, v(MI) = 76:389, v(MA) = 72:410; v(MAI),
where v(MAI) is a function of the merchant discount rate d, as given in (40).
Next, we solve the equation set fM4(d) = M and A4(d) = Ag, where M4(d)
and A4(d) are given in Section 4.1.4, and M and A are given as in (42);
and nd the Shapley value-characterized merchant discount rate and interchange
fee rate as dSP = 4:973% and fSP = 2:003%, respectively. The corresponding
characteristic value of the grand coalition fMAIg is v(MAI) = 145:817. We
easily nd that 4:307%  dSP  min(dMA; fMI) = min(7:507%; 7:704%) but
fSP < 2:507, which means that (dSP ; fSP ) is not in the set  in (41). Therefore,
as Corollary 2 indicates, the core must be empty and the grand coalition fMAIg
must be thus unstable. 
Next, we provide another example to show that the core may be non-empty
if the Shapley value is used to determine the merchant discount rate and the
interchange fee rate for the credit card network.
Example 3 We re-consider Example 2 but assume that the acquirers and the
issuers per dollar operation costs cA and cI are both equal to 0:5%, i.e., cA =
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cI = 0:005; and the parameter  = 15, which is greater than  = 10. Similarly,
we calculate the characteristic values v(M), v(MA), and v(MI); and thus nd
the three-player cooperative game as,
v(?) = 0; v(A) = v(I) = 0, v(M) = 12:184;
v(AI) = 0, v(MI) = 76:479, v(MA) = 46:406; v(MAI).
Then, we solve the equations M4(d) = M and A4(d) = A, and nd the Shapley
value-characterized merchant discount rate and interchange fee rate as dSP =
5:720% and fSP = 2:895%, respectively. It follows that v(MAI) = 143:362. Since
5:031%  dSP  min(dMA; fMI) = min(9:636%; 7:885%) and fSP  2:885%, we
nd that dSP and fSP are in the set  in (41) and, as Corollary 2 indicates, the
core must be non-empty. That is, if the merchant, the acquirer and the issuer
choose dSP and fSP , then the grand coalition fMAIg must be stable and all of
the three players are willing to cooperate for the credit card business. 
The Nucleolus Since the Shapley value-characterized rates (dSP ; fSP ) may
not be in the set , we use another common concept the nucleolus to nd a
unique pair of the rates. For our three-player cooperative game, the nucleolus
solution is dened as a 3-tuple imputation x = (xM ; xA; xI) such that the excess
(unhappiness) eS(x) = v(S)  
P
i2S xi of any possible coalition S cannot be
lowered without increasing any other greater excess; see, Schmeidler [29]. Accord-
ing to this denition, we nd that the nucleolus is a solution concept that makes
the largest unhappiness of the coalitions as small as possible, or, equivalently,
minimizes the worst inequity. A most common approach to nd the nucleolus
is the sequential LP method that is based on lexicographic ordering (Maschler
et al. [22]). Using the LP approach, we should rst reduce the largest excess
maxfeS(x), for all S  Ng as much as possible, then decrease the second largest
excess as much as possible, and continue this process until the 3-tuple imputation
x is determined.
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Since the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate must be in the
set  [given in (41)], we should add the constraints in the set  (i.e., f + dMA  
cI  d  min(dMA; fMI) and fMI   cA  f) when we solve the sequence of LP
problems to nd the nucleolus. This assures that the allocation scheme in terms
of the nucleolus must be in the non-empty core. We let dn and fn respectively
denote the merchant discount rate and the interchange fee rate that correspond
to the nucleolus. For our game, the LP algorithm is develop as follows:
1. We solve the rst LP model, which is developed as,
min
d;f
u
s.t. (i) v(T ) Pi2T xi  u, for any T  fM;A; Ig;
(ii) xM + xA + xI = v(MAI);
(iii) xM = M4(d) and xA = A4(d);
(iv) f + dMA   cI  d  min(dMA; fMI)
and fMI   cA  f ,
(43)
where u denotes the unhappinessof the most unhappy coalition. In the
above LP problem, the constraint (i) assures that the unhappiness of all
coalitions are smaller than or equal to the maximum unhappiness (upper
bound) u; the constraint (ii) assures that v(MAI) is completely allocated
among M , A and I; the constraint (iii) assures that the three rms imple-
ment the allocation by determining d and f , as discussed previously; and
the constraint (iv) assures that the game has a non-empty core incorpo-
rating the nucleolus. Because, as Corollary 2 indicates,  is non-empty
when  > 1, the solution of the above linear problem must exist under the
assumption that  > 1.
Solving the rst LP, we can nd an optimal solution that minimizes the
most unhappy coalitions unhappiness. Next, we should determine whether
or not the optimal solution for the rst LP problem is the constrained
nucleolus solution (dn; fn). We nd the nucleolus (dn; fn) and terminate
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our search if one of the following two things occurs:
(a) If all constraints are binding, then we can terminate our search and
the optimal solution for the rst LP problem is the nucleolus solution
(dn; fn). This is justied as follows: If the players in the coalition T are
the most unhappy and their total unhappiness (i.e., v(T ) Pi2T xi) is
minimized by solving the rst linear problem, then, in the constraint
set (i), the constraint corresponding to the coalition T must be binding,
i.e.,
P
i2T xi+u = v(T ); and vice versa. Therefore, when all constraints
are binding, all coalitionsunhappiness are minimized and the optimal
solution (for the rst LP problem) is the nucleolus.
(b) If one or more constraints are not binding for the rst LP problem
but the binding constraints in the rst LP problem can uniquely de-
termine an optimal solution, then we can still terminate our search
and the optimal solution (for the rst LP problem) is the nucleolus
solution (dn; fn). This is explained as follows: When we minimize the
second most unhappiness, we shall still use the constrained minimiza-
tion model in (43) but, in the constraint set (i), the inequality is
changed to the equality =for each binding constraint that results
from the minimization of the largest unhappiness in the rst LP prob-
lem. Since the equalities can uniquely determine an optimal solution,
the optimal solution for the second LP problem must be the same as
that for the rst LP problem. For example, if the constraints corre-
spond to the coalitions fMg, fAg and fIg are binding, then we can nd
a unique optimal solution by solving the equations fv(M)   xM = u,
v(A)   xA = u and v(I)   xI = ug, where u is the minimum value
found by solving the rst LP problem.
Otherwise, if neither of the above two things occurs, then we should continue
with the second step.
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2. For the second LP problem, we solve the constrained minimization model in
(43) where, in the constraint set (i), the inequality is replaced with the
equality =for each binding constraint in the rst LP problem. Similar
to the above rst step, after solving the second LP problem, we should
examine (i) what constraints are binding and (ii) whether or not the binding
constraints can determine a unique optimal solution. If all constraints are
binding and/or the binding constraints can uniquely determine an optimal
solution, then we can terminate our search and the solution for the second
LP problem is the constrained nucleolus solution (dn; fn); otherwise, we
should continue with the third step.
3. We repeat the above steps until all constraints are binding and/or the bind-
ing constraints uniquely determine an optimal solution; and the correspond-
ing optimal solution is the constrained nucleolus solution (dn; fn).
For a detailed discussion of the LP approach for the nucleolus solution, see,
e.g., Leng and Parlar [19], Wang [42], etc. Next, we provide a numerical example
to illustrate the calculation of dn and fn when the nucleolus solution is used to
allocate the system-wide prot v(MAI) among the merchant, the acquirer, and
the issuer.
Example 4 We consider the parameter values in Example 2 where the merchant
discount rate and the interchange fee rate corresponding to Shapley value cannot
assure the stability of the grand coalition fMAIg. As Example 2 indicates,
dMA = 7:704% and fMI = 7:507%; and v(M) = 25:409, v(MA) = 72:410, and
v(MI) = 76:389. Recall from Section 4.1 that v(?) = v(A) = v(I) = v(AI) = 0.
To nd dn and fn in terms of the nucleolus solution, we next follow our above
procedure to solve a series of LP problems. We start with the rst linear problem,
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which is specied as follows:
mind;f u
s.t. 25:409  xM  u,   xA  u,   xI  u,
72:410  xM   xA  u, 76:389  xM   xI  u,   xA   xI  u;
xM + xA + xI = v(MAI);
xM = M4(d) and xA = A4(d);
f   2:304%  d  7:507% and 2:507%  f .
(44)
Solving the constrained minimization problem in (44), we nd that (d; f) =
(5:764%; 2:932%); the minimum value of the most unhappiness is u =  32:656;
and xM = 76:389, xA = 32:656, and xI = 32:656. One can easily nd that the
constraints that  xA  u,  xI  u and v(MI) xM  xI  u are binding, which
means that the most unhappy coalitions are fAg, fIg and fMIg. Although
the constraints corresponding to other coalitions are not binding, we can solve
the equations f xA =  32:656; xI =  32:656; 76:389   xM   xI =  32:656g
to determine the unique merchant discount rate and the unique interchange fee
rate as d = 5:764% and f = 2:932%, respectively. According to our above
discussion, we can terminate our search with the nucleolus-characterized merchant
discount rate as dn = 5:764% and the nucleolus-characterized interchange fee
rate as fn = 2:932%. Since the solution (dn; fn) satises the constraints that
fn + dMA   cI  dn  min(dMA; fMI) and fMI   cA  fn, we conclude from
Corollary 2 that the allocation scheme in terms of (dn; fn) must be in a non-
empty core and the grand coalition fMAIg must be thus stable. That is, if the
nucleolus-based solution (dn; fn) is implemented for the credit card network, then
the merchant, the acquirer and the issuer should be willing to join the network and
cooperate for the credit card business. This is di¤erent from the Shapley value-
based solution given in Example 2 since the latter cannot assure the stability of
the grand coalition fMAIg.
We compare the nucleolus-characterized interchange fee and merchant dis-
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count rates with those (i.e., f  = 4:37% and dS = 10:37%) found in Example
1 where we used the two-stage approach specied in Section 3 to nd the inter-
change fee rate and the merchant discount rate. It follows from the comparison
that, if the merchant is allowed to bargain with the issuer and the acquirer, then
both the merchant discount and the interchange fee rate are reduced. 
In the following example, we consider the parameter values in Example 4
where the Shapley value-based allocation scheme is located in a non-empty core
to compute the merchant discount rate and the interchange fee rate that deter-
mine the nucleolus solution.
Example 5 We learn from Example 4 that dMA = 9:636% and fMI = 7:885%;
and v(M) = 12:184, v(MA) = 46:406, and v(MI) = 76:479. Moreover, v(?) =
v(A) = v(I) = v(AI) = 0, as discussed in Section 4.1. We can thus specify the
rst LP problem in (43) as,
mind;f u
s.t. 12:184  xM  u,   xA  u,   xI  u,
46:406  xM   xA  u, 76:479  xM   xI  u,   xA   xI  u;
xM + xA + xI = v(MAI);
xM = M4(d) and xA = A4(d);
f   2:136%  d  7:885% and 2:885%  f .
(45)
Solving the above minimization problem, we nd that (d; f) = (5:764%; 2:885%);
the minimum value of the most unhappiness is u =  33:312; and xM = 76:395,
xA = 33:123, and xI = 33:396. It is easy to nd that the constraints that
 xA  u and v(MI)   xM   xI  u are binding, which means that the most
unhappy coalitions are fAg and fMIg. Even though the constraints correspond-
ing to other coalitions are not binding, we can solve the equations f xA =
 33:312; 76:479   xM   xI =  33:312g to uniquely determine the merchant
discount rate and the interchange fee rate as d = 5:764% and f = 2:885%,
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respectively. Thus, as discussed above, we can terminate our search and nd the
nucleolus-characterized merchant discount rate as dn = 5:764% and the nucleolus-
characterized interchange fee rate as fn = 2:885%. As Corollary 2 indicates, the
allocation scheme in terms of (dn; fn) must be in a non-empty core and the grand
coalition fMAIg must be stable, because (dn; fn) 2 . Hence, the merchant, the
acquirer and the issuer should be willing to accept the nucleolus-based solution
(dn; fn) for the credit card network.
Compare the nucleolus-based solution (dn; fn) with the Shapley value-based
solution (dSP ; fSP ) = (5:720%; 2:895%) that is given in Example 4. We nd that
the nucleolus solution concept suggests a higher merchant discount rate but a
lower interchange fee rate for the credit card network. Given this result, the
acquirer should prefer the nucleolus to the Shapley value, whereas the issuer
should be inclined to the Shapley value. 
5 Sensitivity Analysis and Managerial Implica-
tions
In this section, we examine the impacts of the acquirers and the issuers oper-
ation costs on the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate that are
determined by solving the two-stage game model (given in Section 3) and the
three-player cooperative game model (given in Section 4). According to a large
number of numerical examples, we nd that the Shapley value-characterized rates
can assure the non-emptiness of the core only when  is in a small range (e.g.,
[14:91; 15:1] for other parameter values as given in Examples 2 and 4). That is, for
most cases, the Shapley value cannot result in the stability of the grand coalition
fMAIg. Thus, for the sensitivity analysis in the three-player cooperative game
setting, we dont consider the Shapley value but only use the nucleolus solution
to compute the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate.
We note from Sections 3 and 4 that the acquirers and the issuers per dollar
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operation costs (i.e., cA and cI) a¤ect the interchange fee rate and the merchant
discount rate in both the two-stage and the cooperative game settings. But,
the parameters  and  only impact our cooperative game analysis. Recall from
Section 4 that the parameter  distinguishes the operation cost of the merchant
or issuer who acts as an acquirer from that of the acquirer in the credit card
network; and the parameter  discriminates the operation cost of the merchant
or acquirer who acts as an issuer from that of the issuer in the credit card
network. To that end, we discuss the impacts of the parameters cA and cI on
the solutions obtained from both two-stage and cooperative game analysis, but
investigate the e¤ects of the parameters  and  on the solution only given by
the cooperative game analysis.
Next, we perform our sensitivity analysis by using the parameter values in
Example 2 as base values. According to our results from the sensitivity analysis,
we provide our discussion and draw managerial implications.
5.1 The Impacts of the Unit Operating Costs cA and cI
We now investigate the e¤ects of the parameters cA and cI on the Stackelberg
interchange fee and merchant discount rates (fS; dS) for the two-stage game set-
ting, and also on the nucleolus-characterized rates (fn; dn) for the three-player
game setting. The parameters cA and cI are the acquirers and the issuers per
dollar operation costs, respectively. We begin by examining the impacts of the
acquirers per dollar operation cost cA. In this sensitivity analysis, we increase
the value of cA from 0.20% to 0.65% in increments of 0.05%, and compute the
Stackelberg solution (fS; dS) and the nucleolus-based solution (fn; dn). For our
computational results, see Table 1 in Appendix D. Using the data in Table 1, we
plot two graphs (given in Figure 2) to help discuss managerial insights.
We nd from Figure 2(a) that the nucleolus-based interchange fee and mer-
chant discount rates fn and dn are signicantly smaller than the Stackelberg rates
fS and dS, respectively. That is, when the merchant is allowed to bargain over
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Figure 2: The impacts of the parameters cA and cI on the Stackelberg solution
(fS; dS) for the two-stage game setting and the nucleolus-based solution (fn; dn)
for the three-player cooperative game setting.
the rates with the issuer and the acquirer, the rates should be decreased, as ex-
pected by, e.g., the U.S. recent bill H.R. 2695. Moreover, we also learn from
Figure 2(a) that, as cA increases, the merchant discount rates dS and dn are both
increased; this is justied as follows: When the acquirers per dollar operation
cost cA is higher, the merchant discount rate would be increased to assure the
acquirers prot. Otherwise, the acquirer may be unwilling to participate in the
credit card business. In addition, we note that the Stackelberg rate dS (when
the merchant doesnt bargain over the rate) is increased at a lower rate than the
nucleolus-characterized rate dn (when the merchant bargains over the rate).
Figure 2(a) indicates that, as cA increases, the two-stage game analysis and
the three-player cooperative game analysis result in di¤erent patterns for the
interchange fee rate. More specically, from our two-stage game analysis, we nd
that, if the merchant is not involved in the negotiation for the interchange fee
rate and the merchant discount rate, then the interchange fee rate is reduced at
a low rate. This occurs because, in the two-stage game setting, when only the
issuer and the acquirer bargain over the interchange fee rate, the issuer is willing
to reduce the rate to o¤set the acquirers increasing operation cost cA. However,
we learn from the cooperative game analysis that, if the merchant bargains with
the issuer and the acquirer, then the interchange fee rate is reduced at a low
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rate when cA is smaller than a cuto¤ level (e.g., 0:40) but is increased when cA
is greater than the cuto¤ level. This result is explained as follows: When cA
is su¢ ciently small (e.g., cA  0:40), increasing cA leads to a higher operation
cost for the acquirer, who may thus bargain with the issuer and the merchant to
reduce the interchange fee rate. Since the reduction of the interchange fee rate is
smaller as cA is small, the issuer and the merchant may agree to decrease the rate
so as to entice the acquirer to stay in the grand coalition fMAIg. When cA is
greater than the cuto¤ level, the issuer may not agree to reduce the interchange
fee rate because a further reduction of the rate would largely lower the issuers
prot. But, increasing the rate may discourage the acquirer to cooperate with
the issuer and the merchant, who may thus suggest to increase the merchant
discount rate at a higher rate. Noting that the acquirers per dollar prot margin
is [(d f) cA], we nd that, in order to o¤set the acquirers increasing operation
cost cA, the acquirer should have an increasing revenue (d   f). Using the data
in Table 1 (given in Appendix D), we have,
cA 0:20% 0:25% 0:30% 0:35% 0:40% 0:45% 0:50% 0:55% 0:60% 0:65%
dn   fn 1:15% 1:43% 1:72% 2:00% 2:28% 2:56% 2:83% 3:04% 3:10% 3:16%
(dn   fn)  cA 0:95% 1:18% 1:42% 1:65% 1:88% 2:11% 2:33% 2:49% 2:50% 2:51%
From the above table, we learn that the acquirers prot margin increases, which
means that the acquirer would be willing to stay in the grand coalition fMAIg.
Next, we discuss the impacts of the issuers per dollar operation cost cI on the
the Stackelberg solution (fS; dS) for the two-stage game setting and the nucleolus-
based solution (fn; dn) for the three-player cooperative game setting. In this
sensitivity analysis, similar to our above analysis for cA, we increase cI from 0.20%
to 0.65% in increments of 0.05%, and compute the Stackelberg solution (fS; dS)
and the nucleolus-based solution (fn; dn) for each value of cI . We nd from Figure
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2(b) that, if cI increases, then the issuer absorbs a higher operation cost and thus
bargains with the acquirer and the merchant to increase the interchange fee rate.
This fact is reected by Figure 2(b), which indicates that both the Stackelberg
rate fS and the nucleolus-based rate fn are increased as cI is increased. But, a
higher interchange fee rate may prevent the acquirer from joining the coalition
fMAIg. In order to entice the acquirer to cooperate with the issuer and the
merchant, all players agree to accordingly increase the merchant discount rate,
as shown by Figure 2(b). Moreover, we nd that the nucleolus solutions fn and
dn change at a larger rate than the Stackelberg solutions fS and dS.
5.2 The Impacts of the Scale Parameters  and 
We now examine the e¤ects of  and  on the nucleolus-characterized solution
(fn; dn). We increase the value of either  or  from 2 to 11 in increments of
1, and compute the nucleolus-based solution (fn; dn). [Note that, as discussed
previously, the Stackelberg solution (fS; dS) is independent of both  and .]
Similar to Section 5.1, our computational results are presented in Table 1 that is
given in Appendix D; and we use the data in Table 1 to plot two graphs in Figure
3.
Figure 3: The impacts of the parameters  and  on the nucleolus-characterized
interchange fee and merchant discount rates (i.e., fn and dn) that are determined
as a result of the negotiation among the issuer, the acquirer and the merchant.
We begin by examining the impacts of the parameter , which is the scale pa-
rameter measuring the per dollar operation cost absorbed by either the merchant
or the issuer, when the acquirer doesnt join the credit card network and either
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the merchant or the issuer instead acts as an acquirer. Figure 3(a) indicates
that fn decreases in  when  is smaller than a cuto¤ level, and increases in ,
otherwise. That is, when  is small, increasing its value can generate a higher op-
eration cost for the player the merchant or the issuer who acts as an acquirer.
Therefore, the player may be unwilling to take this role, and would suggest a
lower interchange fee rate so as to entice the acquirer to join the credit card net-
work. Meanwhile, the merchant discount rate dn increases, thereby assuring that
the acquirers prot margin [(d   f)   cA] increases. However, when  is su¢ -
ciently high, the issuer disagrees to further reduce its interchange fee rate as its
prot would be reduced to a very low level. As a result, the interchange fee rate
increases when   8, see Figure 3(a). But, in order to assure the protability of
the acquirer, the three players in the credit card network may agree to increase
the merchant discount rate at a greater rate. Similar to Section 4.1, we use the
data in Table 1 to calculate the acquirers prot margin (with cA = 0:5%) as
follows:
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
dn   fn 0:77% 1:03% 1:29% 1:56% 1:82% 2:07% 2:33% 2:58% 2:83% 2:99%
(dn   fn)  cA 0:27% 0:53% 0:79% 1:06% 1:32% 1:57% 1:83% 2:08% 2:33% 2:49%
The above table shows that the acquirer should have an incentive to join the
grand coalition fMAIg.
The parameter  is the scale factor that measures the per dollar operation cost
absorbed by the merchant/acquirer when it acts as an issuer. We also vary  from
2 to 11 in increments of 1 to compute the corresponding nucleolus-characterized
solution (fn; dn), see Figure 3(b) and Table 1. Figure 3(b) indicates that, as 
increases, both the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate increase,
which is justied as follows: when  increases, the merchant and the acquirer
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lose the incentive to take the role of an issuer, and they are thus more willing
to increase the interchange fee rate so as to attract the issuer to join the grand
coalition fMAIg. However, raising the interchange fee rate hurts the acquirers
prot; thus, the three players in the network may also agree to increase the
merchant discount rate.
6 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this thesis, we consider a credit card network involving an issuer, an acquirer,
and a merchant who serves consumers in a market with n products. In the
network, the issuer serves as the bank of consumers and the acquirer serves as
the bank of the merchant. After the consumers buy from the merchant using
credit cards issued by the issuer, the issuer should transfer to the acquirer the
amount that is calculated as total transaction amount (i.e., the consumerstotal
expenditure) minus the interchange fee. The interchange fee which is calculated
as the interchange fee rate times the total transaction amount is regarded as
the issuers revenue generated from the credit card business. When the acquirer
receives the amount transferred from the issuer, it retains an amount as its revenue
from the credit card transaction and deposit the remaining to the merchants
account. The amount that the acquirer retains is also proportional to the total
transaction amount, and it is computed as the total transaction amount times
the di¤erence between the merchant discount rate and the interchange fee rate.
We perform the game-theoretic analysis to determine the interchange fee rate
for the issuer, the merchant discount rate for the acquirer, and the retail prices for
the merchant. In practice, the interchange fee rate results from the negotiation
between the issuer and the acquirer; for more discussion, see, e.g., Akers et al. [1],
Balto [2], etc. However, as our literature review indicates, very few publications
(e.g., Small and Wright [34]) determine the interchange fee rate as a result of
the negotiation between the issuer and the acquirer. Furthermore, starting from
June 2009, the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
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America have been implementing the bill Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2009 (H.R.
2695)[15], in which merchants are encouraged to participate in bargaining over
relevant fee rates (i.e., the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate)
with banks in credit card networks (e.g., Visa, MasterCard, etc.) in the United
States. According to our review, we nd that no publication has considered the
negotiation among three players (i.e., the issuer, the acquirer and the merchant)
to determine the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate.
Motived by the above, we considered two approaches to determine the inter-
change fee rate and the merchant discount rate and retail prices for the credit
card network. The rst approach is to develop a two-stage game model. In
the rst stage, the issuer and the acquirer bargain over the interchange fee rate;
and in the second stage, the acquirer rst determines its merchant discount rate
and announces it to the merchant, who then makes its retail pricing decisions.
The rst approach corresponds to the credit card operations where the mer-
chant doesnt participate in the negotiation for the interchange fee rate and the
merchant discount rate. To solve the two-stage game problem, we used the back-
ward method for our calculation. At rst, we determined the optimal merchant
discount rate and retail prices for a given value of interchange fee rate. More
specically, we maximized the merchants prot to obtain its best response deci-
sion (i.e., optimal retail prices), given the interchange fee rate and the merchant
discount rate. Then, using the merchants best response decision, we developed
the acquirers prot function and maximizes it to nd the optimal (Stackelberg
) merchant discount rate, which was proved to be an increasing, convex function
of the interchange fee rate. Substituting the optimal merchant discount rate into
the merchants best response function gave the Stackelberg retail prices that is
dependent on the interchange fee rate. Next, we used the interchange fee rate-
dependent Stackelberg solution to develop the issuers prot, and applied the
solution concept of Nash bargaining scheme to determine the interchange fee,
which was then used to compute the Stackelberg solution for the acquirer and
the merchant.
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The second approach is to construct a three-player cooperative game in the
characteristic function form. This is motived by the fact that the merchant is al-
lowed (and encouraged) to bargain with the issuer and the acquirer over both the
interchange fee and the merchant discount rates, as suggested by, e.g., the recent
U.S. bill entitled Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2009(H.R. 2695). We calculated
the characteristic values of all possible coalitions for our three-player coopera-
tive game. We then derived a su¢ cient condition for the supermodularity, and
attained a su¢ cient and necessary condition under which the core of our coopera-
tive game is non-empty. We proved that there must exist a pair of the interchange
fee rate and the merchant discount rate such that the core is non-empty. Not-
ing that a merchant discount rate and an interchange fee rate determine a unique
allocation scheme, we apply the solution concepts of Shapley value and the nucle-
olus to nd a fair allocation scheme under which the merchant, the acquirer and
the issuer are all better o¤ by joining the credit card network. Then, using the
fair allocation scheme, we calculate the corresponding interchange fee rate and
merchant discount rate. We found that the Shapley value may or may not exist
in a non-empty core, which were demonstrated by two numerical examples. In
order to assure the stability of the grand coalition, we developed an algorithm to
compute the nucleolus solution-characterized interchange fee rate and merchant
discount rate.
In order to nd more managerial insights, we perform a sensitivity analysis
to examine the impacts of credit card operation costs on the interchange fee
rate and the merchant discount rate. Our major analytic managerial insights are
summarized as follows:
1. In the two-stage game setting, the demand of each product in the market
should not be very sensitive to its retail price, in order to assure the success
of the credit card business. Otherwise, if the demand for each product is
more sensitive to the retail price, then the acquirer and the issuer may
attain lower rates and may thus be less willing to participate in the credit
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card business.
2. In the two-stage game setting, if the interchange fee rate is determined by
the issuer itself rather than by the negotiation between the issuer and the
acquirer, then the acquirer would not benet from the credit card business.
This implies that such a two-player negotiation can help entice the acquirer
to stay in the credit card network.
3. In the cooperative game setting, only the large merchants (e.g., JUSCO)
may have an incentive to undertake the credit card operations by itself,
whereas the other merchants (especially, small merchants) may have to
only focus on the retailing service with the nancial services from the issuer
and the acquirer as in the two-stage game setting.
4. We show that the merchants participation in the credit card network is sig-
nicantly important to the protability of the network. Moreover, the issuer
and the acquirer may need to have su¢ cient expertise in the issuer- and the
acquirer-related business, respectively, in order to make the network-wide
prot higher than when the merchant operates the credit card business by
itself or delegates the business to either the issuer or the acquirer.
Moreover, the popularity of the credit card service in the nancial market
would be important to the success of the recent U.S. bill Credit Card
Fair Fee Act of 2009 (H.R. 2695),in which the merchant is encouraged to
participate in the credit card network for the negotiation of the interchange
fee rate and the merchant discount rate.
5. The interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate in the cooperative
game setting are smaller than those in the two-stage game setting. This
means that, as a result of implementing the U.S. bill H.R. 2695, both
rates are reduced, which shows that the bill is e¤ective.
6. The U.S. bill H.R. 2695 should be more e¤ective, if the issuer, the ac-
quirer, and the merchant are all more specialized in their own operations.
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That is, the success of the bill may also require that the participants in
the negotiation of the merchant discount rate and the interchange fee rate
are the large, highly-specialized banks (e.g., Citibank) and merchants (e.g.,
Wal-Mart). This insight could be justied by the fact that, in practice,
many small merchants may be unwilling or against to accept the credit
cards; see Tozzi [38] and Trichur [39].
In addition to the above, we obtain some important managerial insights from
the numerical study as follows:
1. The interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate in the cooperative
game are signicantly smaller than the Stackelberg equilibrium rates in the
two-stage game setting.
2. The acquirers and the issuers unit operation costs more signicantly im-
pact the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate in the coop-
erative game setting than in the two-stage game setting.
3. The interchange fee rate in the two-stage game setting is always decreasing
in the acquirers unit operation cost cA, whereas the interchange fee rate
in the cooperative game setting is decreasing in cA if cA is smaller than a
cuto¤ level and is otherwise increasing in cA. But, the merchant discount
rate is always increasing in cA in both the two-stage and the cooperative
game settings.
4. In both the two-stage and the cooperative game settings, the interchange
fee rate and the merchant discount rate are always increasing in the issuers
unit operation cost cI .
5. In the cooperative game setting, the interchange fee rate is decreasing in
 which measures the per dollar operation cost absorbed by the mer-
chant/issuer when it acts as an acquirer, if  is smaller than a cuto¤ level,
and is increasing in , otherwise. But, the merchant discount rate is always
increasing in .
66
Moreover, the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate are al-
ways increasing in , which measures the per dollar operation cost absorbed
by the merchant/acquirer when it acts as an issuer.
In conclusion, we nd that the recent U.S. bill H.R. 2695should be useful
to reduce both the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate. We
have identied some important managerial insights that could help improve the
e¢ ciency of the credit card operations.
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Appendices
Appendix A Proofs of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1. Temporarily ignoring the constraint that ci=(1   d) 
pi  i=i, we di¤erentiate M in (2) once and twice w.r.t. pi, and have,
dM
dpi
= (1  d)i + ici   2i(1  d)pi and
d2M
dp2i
=  2i(1  d) < 0,
which implies that M is a strictly concave function of pi. Equating M=dpi to
zero and solving it for pi, we obtain the optimal price pi(d) as given in (4). Since
d   = min[(i ici)=i; i = 1; 2; : : : ; n], we nd that ci=(1 d)  i=i, which
implies that pi(d) in (4) must be between ci=(1  d) and i=i. That is, pi(d) in
(4) satises the constraint in the maximization problem in (3).
Proof of Theorem 2. Temporarily ignoring the constraint that f+cA  d  ,
we calculate the rst- and second-order derivatives of A(d) in (9) w.r.t. d, which
are given as,
@A(d)
@d
=
1
4

!1   !2
(1  d)2

  !2(d  f   cA)
2(1  d)3 , (46)
and
@2A(d)
@d2
=   !2
2(1  d)3  
1
4

2!2
(1  d)3 +
6!2(d  f   cA)
(1  d)4

,
which cannot be immediately determined to be positive or negative. At the
point(s) that satisfy the rst-order condition (i.e., @A(d)=@d = 0), we re-write
the second-order derivative @2A(d)=@d2 as,
@2A(d)
@d2

@A(d)=@d=0
=   !2
2 (1  d)3  
1
4

2!2
(1  d)3 +
3!1
1  d  
3!2
(1  d)3

=   1
4(1  d)

3!1 +
!2
(1  d)2

,
which is negative for any point satisfying @A(d)=@d = 0. This implies that the
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acquirers prot A(d) in (9) is a quasi-concave function of the merchant discount
rate d. That is, A(d) in (9) is a unimodal function of d with a unique maximizing
value d1(f), which, by solving the rst-order condition @A(d)=@d = 0, can be
obtained as the unique solution of the equation (11).
Next, we compute the acquirers optimal merchant discount rate under the
constraint that f + cA  d  . When d = f + cA, we calculate the rst-order
derivative @A(d)=@d in (46) as,
@A(d)
@d

d=f+cA
=
1
4

!1   !2
(1  f   cA)2

,
which is greater than or equal to zero because !1  !2= (1  d)2, as indicated by
Remark 1. This implies that f + cA  d1(f) because A(d) is a quasi-concave
function of d with the unique optimal solution d1(f). As a result, d1(f) must
satisfy the constraint that d  f + cA, which is thus redundant.
When the acquirer sets its merchant discount rate as the largest value , i.e.,
d = , we re-write @A(d)=@d in (46) as,
@A(d)
@d

d=
=
1
4

!1   !2
(1  )2

  !2(  f   cA)
2(1  )3 , (47)
which may be positive or negative, depending on the value of the interchange
fee f . It is easy to nd that @A(d)=@djd= in (47) is strictly increasing in the
interchange fee f , and it is equal to zero if and only if f = f^ , where f^ is given as
in (12).
As a result, when f  f^ , then @A(d)=@djd= must be less than or equal to
zero. Because of the quasi-concavity of A(d),  must be greater than or equal to
d1(f), and it thus follows that the constraint that d   is satised. Hence, when
f  f^ , the optimal merchant discount rate is d(f) = d1(f). On the other hand,
if f^  f  , then @A(d)=@djd= is nonnegative and  is thus smaller than or
equal to d1(f). This means that d(f) = . We thus prove this theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3. As Lemma 1 implies, the function 1(f) in (17) is a
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unimodal function of f with a unique maximizing value ~f1 that satises the rst-
order condition, i.e., @[1(f)]=@f = 0, which can be re-written as (18). Because
of the quasi-concavity of 1(f), we can easily attain f 1 as given in this theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4. Temporarily ignoring the constraint that f^  f  , we
di¤erentiate the function 2(f) in (17) once and twice w.r.t. f , which are given
as,
@[2(f)]
@f
=
1
16
[  2f   cA + cI ]

!1   !2
(1  )2
2
,
and
@2[2(f)]
@f 2
=  1
8


!1   !2
(1  )2
2
< 0,
which implies that the function 2(f) is a strictly concave function of f . Equating
@2(f)=@f to zero and solving it for f , we nd the interchange fee rate ~f2 that
maximizes 2(f) with no constraint as ~f2 = (  cA + cI)=2.
Next, we consider the constraint that f^  f  , and obtain the optimal
interchange-fee rate f 2 . We rst prove that ~f2  . Since   d  f + cA as
discussed in Section 3.1 and f  cI , we nd that   cA + cI , or, cI    cA;
and thus,
~f2 = (  cA + cI) =2  (  cA +   cA) =2 =   cA  .
It then follows that the constrain that f   is redundant. We then consider
the constraint that f^  f . Because of the concavity of 2(f), we nd that the
optimal interchange-fee rate f 2 = max(f^ ; ~f2). At the point that f = f^ , the
rst-order derivative @[2(f)]=@f is computed as,
@[2(f)]
@f

f=f^
=
1
16
"
(cA + cI   1)!2 + (1  )3 !1
!2
#


!1   !2
(1  )2
2
,
which has the same sign as the term (cA + cI   1)!2 + (1  )3 !1. More specif-
ically, we nd that, if r1  r2 where ri (i = 1; 2) are given as in (20), then
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@[2(f)]=@f is non-negative at the point that f = f^ . Because of the concavity
of 2(f), we nd that f^  ~f2 and thus, f 2 = ~f2. If r1  r2, then @[2(f)]=@f is
non-positive at the point that f = f^ , which means that f^  ~f2 and f 2 = f^ . This
theorem is thus proved.
Proof of Theorem 5. According to Theorems 3 and 4, we nd that f 1 =
min( ~f1; f^), where ~f1 is a unique solution satisfying (18); and f 2 is given as in
(19), which depends on the comparison between r1 and r2. If r1  r2, then
f 2 = ~f2, and the NBS-characterized rate f
 is dependent on the comparison
between 1(f 1 ) and 2( ~f2). Noting that ~f1 which satises the complicated
equation (18) cannot determined analytically, we have to write f  as in (21). If
r1  r2, then f 2 = f^ . Since 1(f^) = 2(f^), we nd that the interchange fee rate
f  is obtained as f 1 . This means that, when r1  r2, the acquirer and the issuer
shall choose their interchange fee rate in the range [cI ; f^ ]. This theorem is thus
proved.
Proof of Theorem 6. The rst- and second-order partial derivatives of M1(p)
in (23) w.r.t pi (i = 1; : : : ; n) are computed as,
@[M1(p)]
@pi
=  2ipi(1  cA   cI) + i(1  cA   cI) + ici,
and @2[M1(p)]=@p
2
i =  2(1   cA   cI)i  0, because (1   cA   cI)  0.
Thus, M1(p) is a concave function of pi. Equating @[M1(p)]=@pi to zero and
solving it for pi gives the merchants optimal price p
M1
i , as given in (24). It is
easy to show that pM1i in (24) falls in the range [ci=(1   cA   cI); i=i]. We
thus prove this theorem.
Proof of Theorem 7. Temporarily ignoring the condition that ci=(1   f) 
pi  i=i, we take the rst- and second-order partial derivatives of M2(p) w.r.t
pi, and nd,
@[M2(p)]
@pi
=  2(1 f)ipi+[(1  f)i + ici] and
@2[M2(p)]
@p2i
=  2(1 f)i < 0,
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which implies the concavity of the function M2(p). Equating @[M2(p)]=@pi to
zero and solving it for pi gives the merchants best-response retail price p
M2
i (f)
as shown in (27). Noting from Section 3.1.1 that ci=(1  d)  i=i, i = 1; : : : ; n,
we nd that ci=(1   f)  i=i since f  d. This means that pM2i (f) in (27)
satises the constraint that ci=(1  f)  pi  i=i, which is thus redundant.
Proof of Theorem 8. Using (26), we re-write the value v(M) as,
v(M) =
1
4
Xn
i=1

i   ici
1  cA   cI

i(1  cA   cI)
i
  ci

;
and using (29), we re-write M2(p
M2(f)) as,
M2(p
M2(f)) =
1
4
Xn
i=1

i   ici
1  f

i(1  f)
i
  ci

.
Comparing the right-hand sides of the above two equations, we prove this theo-
rem.
Proof of Theorem 9. Using (29) and (30), we re-write the function MI as,
MI =
f   cI   cA
16


!1(1  f) + !2
1  f   2
Xn
i=1
(ici)  4v(M)



!1   !2
(1  f)2

.
Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, we analyze the property of the logarithm of
MI . Taking the rst- and second-order derivatives of ln(MI) w.r.t. f gives,
@[ln(MI)]
@f
=
1
f   cI   cA  
!1   !2=(1  f)2
!1(1  f) + !2=(1  f)  2
Pn
i=1(ici)  4v(M)
  2!2=(1  f)
3
!1   !2=(1  f)2 ,
@2[ln(MI)]
@f 2
=   1
(f   cI   cA)2  
[2!2=(1  f)3]2
[!1   !2=(1  f)2]2  
6!2=(1  f)4
!1   !2=(1  f)2
  [!1   !2=(1  f)
2]2
[!1(1  f) + !2=(1  f)  2
Pn
i=1(ici)  4v(M)]2
+
2!2=(1  f)3
!1(1  f) + !2=(1  f)  2
Pn
i=1(ici)  4v(M)
.
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At the point(s) satisfying the rst-order condition that @[ln(MI1 )]=@f = 0, we
have,
1
f   cI   cA =
!1   !2=(1  f)2
!1(1  f) + !2=(1  f)  2
Pn
i=1(ici)  4v(M)
+
2!2=(1  f)3
!1   !2=(1  f)2 ,
or,
2!2=(1  f)3
[f   cI   cA][!1   !2=(1  f)2]  
[2!2=(1  f)3]2
[!1   !2=(1  f)2]2
=
2!2=(1  f)3
!1(1  f) + !2=(1  f)  2
Pn
i=1(ici)  4v(M)
.
It thus follows that @2[ln(MI1 )]=@f
2 can be re-written as,
@2[ln(MI1 )]
@f 2
=   1
(f   cI   cA)2  
[2!2=(1  f)3]2
[!1   !2=(1  f)2]2
+
2!2=(1  f)3
[f   cI   cA][!1   !2=(1  f)2]
  [2!2=(1  f)
3]2
[!1   !2=(1  f)2]2  
6!2=(1  f)4
!1   !2=(1  f)2
  [!1   !2=(1  f)
2]2
[!1(1  f) + !2=(1  f)  2
Pn
i=1(ici)  4v(M)]2
,
which is negative because
1
(f   cI   cA)2 +
[2!2=(1  f)3]2
[!1   !2=(1  f)2]2 >
2!2=(1  f)3
[f   cI   cA][!1   !2=(1  f)2] .
Therefore, we conclude that ln(MI1 ) is a quasi-concave function, which means
that MI1 is also a quasi-concave function, because of the following fact: Since
@[ln(MI1 )]=@f = (@
MI
1 =@f)=(
MI), we nd that @[ln(MI1 )]=@f and @
MI
1 =@f
can be zero at the same point(s). Therefore, at the points that satises @[ln(MI1 )]=@f =
0, @MI1 =@f must be also equal to zero, i.e., @
MI
1 =@f = 0; and thus, @
2[ln(MI1 )]=@f =
(@2MI1 =@f)=(
MI
1 )   (@MI1 =@f)2=(MI1 )2 = (@2MI1 =@f)=(MI1 ). This means
that @2[ln(MI1 )]=@f and @
2MI1 =@f have the same sign at the points satisfying
@[ln(MI1 )]=@f = 0. As shown above, @
2[ln(MI1 )]=@f j@2[ln(MI1 )]=@f=0 < 0; so, we
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can nd that @2MI1 =@f j@MI1 =@f=0 < 0.
Proof of Theorem 10. This proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 8.
Proof of Theorem 11. This is similar to the proof of Theorem 9.
Proof of Theorem 12. We learn from Driessen [10] that, in order to show the
supermodularity, we need to prove that v(S [ fig)   v(S)  v(T [ fig)   v(T ),
for all S  T  Nnfig, i = M;A; I. If S = T , then the above condition for the
supermodularity must be satised. Next, we assume that S  T  Nnfig, and
examine if the above condition is satised.
1. If S = f?g and T = fMg, then player i is either A or I, and we nd that
v(S [ fig)  v(S) = v(i)  v(?) = 0, because v(?) = v(A) = v(I) = 0; and
v(T [fig)  v(T ) = v(Mi)  v(M), which must be greater than or equal to
zero if f  d  cA + cI , as indicated by Theorems 8 and 10. Therefore,
for this case (i.e., S = ? and T = M), the supermodularity condition must
be satised.
2. If S = f?g and T = fAg, then player i is either M or I. If i = I, then
v(S [ fIg)  v(S) = v(I)  v(?) = v(T [ fIg)  v(T ) = v(AI)  v(A) = 0.
If i = M , then we nd that
v(S [ fMg)  v(S) = v(M)  v(T [ fMg)  v(T ) = v(MA),
which results from our discussion in Section 4.1.3.
3. If S = f?g and T = fIg, then player i is either M or A. Similar to
the second case, we nd that the supermodularity condition is satised,
according to Section 4.1.2.
4. If S = fAg and T = fAIg, then player i is M . As a result, v(S [ fMg) 
v(S) = v(MA) and v(T [fMg) v(T ) = v(MAI). From Sections 4.1.3 and
4.1.4, we nd that, for the coalitions fMAg and fMAIg, the merchants
optimal retail price is [i=i + ci=(1   d)]=2, for i = 1; : : : ; n, where, but,
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the merchant discount rate d is negotiated by M and A in the coalition
fMAg whereas d results from the negotiation among M , A and I in the
grand coalition fMAIg. We re-write the characteristic values of the two
coalitions as,
v(MA) =
1  cA   cI
4

!1   !2
(1  dMA)2

 
Xn
i=1

ci
2

i
i
+
ci
1  dMA

,
v(MAI) =
1  cA   cI
4

!1   !2
(1  d)2

 
Xn
i=1

ci
2

i
i
+
ci
1  d

.
From the above, we nd that, if d  dMA, then v(MAI)  v(MA).
5. If S = fAg and T = fMAg, then player i is I, and it thus follows that
v(S [ fIg)  v(S) = 0 and v(T [ fIg)  v(T ) = v(MAI)  v(MA), which
is non-negative if d  dMA, as discussed for the fourth case.
6. If S = fIg and T = fAIg, then player i is M . As a result, v(S [ fMg)  
v(S) = v(MI) and v(T [ fMg)   v(T ) = v(MAI). Similar to the fourth
case, we nd that, if d  fMI , then v(MAI)  v(MI). Note that, in the
coalition fMIg, fMI is equivalent to the merchant discount rate because
the issuer also acts as an acquirer.
7. If S = fIg and T = fMIg, then player i is A. Hence, v(S[fAg) v(S) = 0
and v(T [ fAg)  v(T ) = v(MAI)  v(MI). Similar to the sixth case, we
nd that, if d  fMI , then v(MAI)  v(MI).
8. If S = fMg and T = fMAg, then player i is I. As a result, v(S [ fIg)  
v(S) = v(MI) v(M) and v(T [fIg) v(T ) = v(MAI) v(MA). For this
case, we need to nd whether or not v(MAI) + v(M)  v(MA) + v(MI).
Because of the intractable complexity, we cannot compare v(MAI) + v(M)
and v(MA) + v(MI) analytically. But, we note that, if v(MAI) + v(M) 
v(MA) + v(MI), then v(MAI) must be greater than or equal to both
v(MA) and v(MI).
9. If S = fMg and T = fMIg, then player i is A. Similar to the eighth case,
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we cannot determine if v(MAI) + v(M) is greater than v(MA) + v(MI)
analytically.
In conclusion, we prove this theorem.
Proof of Theorem 13. We use the denition of the core (given by Gillies [12].)
to derive the su¢ cient conditions. That is, we should analyze the inequalities thatP
i2T yi  v(T ), for all coalitions T  N = fM;A; Ig. Note that, as discussed
previously, yM = M4(d), yA = A4(d), and yI = I4(f), where the functions
i4(d) (i = M;A; I) are given as in Section 4.1.4.
1. When T = fAg, v(T ) = v(A) = 0 and
X
i2T
yi = yA = A4(d) = (d f   cA)R(d) =
d  f   cA
4

!1   !2
(1  d)2

.
If f + cA  d  1 
p
!2=!1, then yA  v(A).
2. When T = fIg, v(T ) = v(I) = 0 and
X
i2T
yi = yI = (f   cI)R(d) = f   cI
4

!1   !2
(1  d)2

.
If f  cI and d  1 
p
!2=!1, then yI  v(I).
3. When T = fMg, v(T ) = v(M) which is given as in (26) and
X
i2T
yi = yM =
1
4
Xn
i=1
[i(1  d)  ici]2
i(1  d)
.
Comparing the above with (26), we nd that, if d  cA + cI , then yM 
v(M).
4. When T = fA; Ig, v(T ) = v(AI) = 0 and
X
i2T
yi = yA + yI =
d  cA   cI
4

!1   !2
(1  d)2

,
which is greater than or equal to v(AI) if cA + cI  d  1 
p
!2=!1.
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5. When T = fM; Ig, v(T ) = v(MI), which, using (33) and (34), can be
re-written as,
v(MI) =
1
4
Xn
i=1
"
i(1  fMI)  ici
2
i(1  fMI)
#
+
fMI   cI   cA
4

!1   !2
(1  fMI)2

,
Moreover, we have,
X
i2T
yi = yM+yI =
1
4
Xn
i=1
[i(1  d)  ici]2
i(1  d)
+
f   cI
4

!1   !2
(1  d)2

,
which is greater than or equal to v(MI) if fMI   cA  f  d  fMI .
6. When T = fM;Ag, v(T ) = v(MA); that is,
v(MA) =
1
4
Xn
i=1

(1  dMA)i   ici
2
i (1  dMA)
+
dMA   cA   cI
4

!1   !2
(1  dMA)2

.
We also have,
X
i2T
yi = yM+yA =
1
4
Xn
i=1
[i(1  d)  ici]2
i(1  d)
+
d  f   cA
4

!1   !2
(1  d)2

,
which is greater than or equal to v(MA) if f + dMA   cI  d  dMA.
7. When T = N = fM;A; Ig, v(T ) = v(MAI) =
X
i2T
yi.
Summarizing the above, we nd the conditions in (41) that assures that the
core is non-empty. In addition, we note from (41) that the negotiated merchant
discount rate and interchange fee rate are no more than dMA and fMI , respec-
tively. We can also easily nd that, if the conditions in (41) are not satised,
then the core must be empty. Thus, we arrive to this theorem.
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Appendix B Proofs of Corollaries
Proof of Corollary 1. We learn from (10) that d(f) is equal to either d1(f)
given by (11) or  which is constant. In order to prove this corollary, we only
need to investigate the impact of f on d1(f). Taking the rst-order derivative of
d1(f) w.r.t. f at both sides of (11), we have,
@[d1(f)]
@f
=
2!2
3[1  d1(f)]2!1 + !2 > 0,
which implies that d1(f) is strictly increasing in f . Moreover, we nd that
@[d1(f)]
@f
  1 =  3!1   !2=[1  d1(f)]
2
3[1  d1(f)]2!1 + !2 < 0,
where !1   !2=[1   d1(f)]2 > 0, because d1(f)   if f  f^ ; and as Remark 1
indicates, !1   !2=(1   d)2  0 when d  . In order to show the convexity of
d1(f), we compute the second-order derivative of d1(f) w.r.t. f as follows:
@2[d1(f)]
@f 2
=
12[1  d1(f)]!1!2
f3[1  d1(f)]2!1 + !2g2
@d1(f)
@f
> 0,
which means that d1(f) is convex in f . This corollary is thus proved.
Proof of Corollary 2. Using the above discussion, we nd that the set  in
(41) must be non-empty if  > 1. Moreover, if (d; f) 2 , then we learn from
the proof of Theorem 13 that the allocation scheme in terms of d and f must be
in the core. That is, the allocation scheme assures that all players are better o¤
by joining the grand coalition fMAIg, which is thus stable. But, as discussed
above, the core must be empty if  = 1.
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Appendix C Proof of Lemma 1
We calculate the logarithm of 1(f) in (17) as ln[1(f)] = (1 + 2 + 3)=16,
where
1  ln (f   cI) , 2  ln[d1(f)  f   cA] and 3  2 ln

!1   !2
(1  d1(f))2

.
In order to prove the concavity of ln[1(f)], we should analyze i (i = 1; 2; 3) as
follows:
1. The rst- and second-order derivatives of 1 w.r.t. f are computed as,
@1
@f
=
1
f   cI and
@21
@f 2
=   1
[f   cI ]2 < 0,
which means that 1 is strictly concave in f .
2. The rst- and second-order derivatives of 2 w.r.t. f are found as,
@2
@f
=
1
d1(f)  f   cA

@[d1(f)]
@f
  1

,
@22
@f 2
=   1
[d1(f)  f   cA]2

@[d1(f)]
@f
  1
2
+
1
d1(f)  f   cA
@2[d1(f)]
@f 2
,
which cannot be immediately determined to be positive or negative because
@2[d1(f)]=@f
2 > 0, as shown by Corollary 1. According to Theorem 2, we
nd that d1(f) is determined by (11), which is obtained by simplifying (46).
This means that d1(f) satises (46); that is,
1
d1(f)  f   cA =
2!2
(1  d1(f))3[!1   !2=(1  d1(f))2] .
It thus follows that the second term on the right-hand side of @22=@f
2 can
be re-written as,
1
d1(f)  f   cA
@2[d1(f)]
@f 2
=
2!2
(1  d1(f))3[!1   !2=(1  d1(f))2]
@2[d1(f)]
@f 2
.
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3. The rst- and second-order derivatives of 3 w.r.t. f are calculated as,
@3
@f
=   4!2
(1  d1(f))3[!1   !2=(1  d1(f))2]
@[d1(f)]
@f
,
@23
@f 2
=  

4(!2)
2
(1  d1(f))6[!1   !2=(1  d1(f))2]2
+
12!2
(1  d1(f))4[!1   !2=(1  d1(f))2]



@[d1(f)]
@f
2
  4!2
(1  d1(f))3[!1   !2=(1  d1(f))2]
@2[d1(f)]
@f 2
,
which is negative; this means that 3 is strictly concave in f .
Using the above, we calculate the sum of @22=@f
2 and @23=@f
2 as,
@22
@f 2
+
@23
@f 2
=   1
[d1(f)  f   cA]2

@[d1(f)]
@f
  1
2
 

4(!2)
2
(1  d1(f))6[!1   !2=(1  d1(f))2]2
+
12!2
(1  d1(f))4[!1   !2=(1  d1(f))2]



@[d1(f)]
@f
2
  2!2
(1  d1(f))3[!1   !2=(1  d1(f))2]
@2[d1(f)]
@f 2
,
which is negative. Since @21=@f
2 < 0, we can conclude that ln[1(f)] = (1 +
2 + 3)=16 is strictly concave in f . This lemma is thus proved.
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Appendix D Results of the Sensitivity Analysis
in Section 5
cA(%) f
S(%) dS(%) fn(%) dn(%)  fn(%) dn(%)
0:20 4:4557 10:2737 2:6549 3:8047 2 2:6886 3:4544
0:25 4:4419 10:2903 2:6358 4:0702 3 2:6725 3:7029
0:30 4:4281 10:3068 2:6148 4:3323 4 2:6549 3:9487
0:35 4:4142 10:3234 2:5917 4:5905 5 2:6358 4:1911
0:40 4:4004 10:3399 2:5663 4:8443 6 2:6148 4:4299
0:45 4:3866 10:3565 2:7052 5:2605 7 2:5917 4:6644
0:50 4:3728 10:3730 2:9323 5:7646 8 2:5663 4:8940
0:55 4:3590 10:3896 3:0873 6:1245 9 2:6802 5:2605
0:60 4:3452 10:4062 3:0978 6:1957 10 2:9323 5:7646
0:65 4:3314 10:4228 3:1077 6:2654 11 3:0883 6:0765
cI(%) f
S(%) dS(%) fn(%) dn(%)  fn(%) dn(%)
0:20 4:0834 10:2407 1:0417 3:5016 2 0:9177 3:3947
0:25 4:1195 10:2572 1:3000 3:7458 3 1:2336 3:6934
0:30 4:1557 10:2737 1:5572 3:9877 4 1:5473 3:9881
0:35 4:1919 10:2903 1:8132 4:2271 5 1:8585 4:2781
0:40 4:2281 10:3068 2:0677 4:4636 6 2:1667 4:5625
0:45 4:2642 10:3234 2:3206 4:6967 7 2:4712 4:8424
0:50 4:3004 10:3399 2:5725 5:1449 8 2:7737 5:4474
0:55 4:3366 10:3565 2:8243 5:5987 9 2:9323 5:7646
0:60 4:3728 10:3730 2:9323 5:7646 10 2:9465 5:7931
0:65 4:4090 10:3896 2:9921 5:8341 11 2:9599 5:8198
Table 1: The impacts of the parameters cA and cI on the Stackelberg interchange
fee rate and merchant discount rate (fS; dS) for the two-stage game setting and
the nucleolus-characterized rates (fn; dn) for the three-player cooperative game
setting; and the impacts of  and  on the nucleolus-characterized rates (fn; dn)
for the three-player cooperative game setting.
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